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This paper empirically assesses the incidence and efficiency of Round I of the federal urban Empowerment
Zone (EZ) program using confidential microdata from the Decennial Census and the Longitudinal
Business Database. To ground our welfare analysis, we develop a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium
model in which the distortions generated by place-based policies depend upon a set of reduced form
elasticities which our empirical work centers on estimating. Using rejected and future applicants to
the EZ program as controls we find that EZ designation substantially increased employment in zone
neighborhoods, particularly for zone residents. The program also generated wage increases for workers
from zone neighborhoods worth approximately $320M per year. Based upon estimates of the number
of jobs created for zone residents, we find that EZ employment credits generated deadweight costs
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pkline@econ.berkeley.eduA growing class of \place based" policies explicitly target transfers towards particular
geographic areas rather than groups of individuals.1 Economists have traditionally expressed
little support for such programs, fearing that they will generate large distortions in economic
behavior.2 Indeed, standard models of spatial equilibrium suggest mobile workers and rms
will arbitrage the benets associated with local policies by relocating across the boundaries
of targeted areas. Local land prices ought then to rise and oset any welfare gains that
might otherwise accrue to prior residents.
This paper critically examines this conjecture by conducting an empirical welfare analysis
of Round I of the federal urban Empowerment Zone (EZ) program { one of the largest place
based policies in the United States. In doing so, we contribute to a growing empirical
literature on the eects of local economic policies including state level \enterprise zones"3
and spatially biased tax policies (Holmes, 1998; Albouy, 2009) in the U.S., and industrial
and regional policies in Europe (Wren and Taylor, 1999; Criscuolo et al, 2007; Bronzini
and de Blasio, 2006). Our work extends these literatures by conducting the rst general
equilibrium evaluation of a large scale highly localized place based policy founded on an
explicit microeconomic model of commuting and labor supply with heterogeneous agents.
We develop a general equilibrium model with landlords, rms, and mobile workers who
make labor supply and commuting decisions. The incidence and eciency of local subsidies
are shown to depend critically upon the distribution of agents' preferences over residential
and commuting options. If most agents are inframarginal in their commuting and residential
decisions, deadweight loss will be small and local workers will reap the benets of place
based interventions. If, on the other hand, agents have nearly identical preferences, as in the
classic models of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), deadweight loss will be substantial and
1See Bartik (2002) and Glaeser and Gottleib (2008) for reviews. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) provide
a useful general discussion of the welfare economics of targeted transfers.
2Kain and Persky (1969) provide an early critique of proposals for \gilding the ghetto". Glaeser and
Gottleib (2008) exemplify the conventional view, stating that \the rationale for spending federal dollars to
try to encourage less advantaged people to stay in economically weak places is itself extremely weak."
3See Papke (1993, 1994), Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Bondonio (2003), Bondonio and Engberg (2000),
Elvery (2003), and Engberg and Greenbaum (1999). Peters and Fisher (2002) provide extensive reviews.
More recently Neumark and Kolko (2010) provide an updated review and an interesting contribution based
upon spatially disaggregate data.
2government expenditures will be capitalized into land rents. We show that our model allows
for simple approximations to the incidence and deadweight loss of EZs via a set of reduced
form elasticities quantifying the program's impact on the wages of local zone workers and
commuters, the rental rate of zone housing, and the number of zone jobs for local residents
and commuters.
Our empirical work centers on estimating these impacts using condential geocoded mi-
crodata from the Decennial Census and the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). These
data provide us with two independent sources of information on local employment and allow
us to adjust for changes over time in the composition of rms and workers. Crucial to our
analysis, the Journey to Work component of the Census allows us to separate the impacts
of EZ designation on workers by place of residence and place of work.
To identify the causal impacts of EZ designation we construct a set of control zones based
upon proprietary data obtained from the Department of Housing and Urban Development
on the census tract composition of rejected and later round Empowerment Zones. Since
these tracts were nominated for designation by their local governments, they are likely to
share unobserved traits and trends in common with rst round EZs which also underwent
a local nomination phase. We present an extensive body of evidence indicating that our
control tracts provide a suitable proxy for the counterfactual behavior of EZs over the 1990s.
To account for the clustered nature of our data, and the fact that only six EZs were awarded
over our sample period, we rely on a wild bootstrap testing procedure studied by Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) to conduct inference.
We nd, in both the LBD and Census, that neighborhoods receiving EZ designation
experienced substantial (13%   19%) increases in total employment relative to observation-
ally equivalent tracts in rejected and future zones. The hourly wages paid to zone residents
working inside the zone also rose signicantly (by approximately 8%). Yet despite these im-
provements in the zone labor market, we nd little evidence of an inux of residents to zone
neighborhoods. Population, rental rates, and vacancy rates all appear stable over the dura-
3tion of the study suggesting that most workers consider zone neighborhoods poor substitutes
for areas outside of the zone.
We conclude with a quantitative assessment of the program's incidence and a calculation
of deadweight costs. We nd that EZ designation generated wage increases for workers from
zone neighborhoods worth approximately $320M per year. Our point estimates also suggest
the earnings of nonresident commuters increased by $580M per year though this gure is
not statistically signicant.
Based upon two independent estimates of the number of zone jobs created for zone
residents, we nd that the tax credits associated with designation yielded relatively small
deadweight costs equal to (at most) seven percent of the ow cost of the subsidy. The
wage increases experienced by non-resident zone workers indicate that the zone block grants
may have raised local productivity levels. Our estimates suggest the benets of those local
investments likely exceeded the dollar cost of the grants by a substantial margin though the
imprecision of our results make this conclusion tentative.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section I provides background on
the EZ program, Section II develops a general equilibrium model of EZs, and Section III
introduces our empirical strategy, Section IV describes the data used, Section V outlines
our main results, Section VI tests for violations of the assumptions underlying our research
design, Section VII conducts a welfare analysis and Section VIII concludes.
I. The Empowerment Zone Program
The federal Empowerment Zone program is a series of spatially targeted tax incentives and
block grants designed to encourage economic, physical, and social investment in the neediest
urban and rural areas in the United States. In 1993 Congress authorized the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to award Empowerment Zones to local com-
munities via a competitive application process. Local governments were invited to submit
4proposals for an EZ dened in terms of 1990 census tracts subject to certain restrictions on
the characteristics of each proposed tract.4
HUD awarded EZs to six urban communities: Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit,
New York City, and Philadelphia/Camden. Two additional cities, Los Angeles and Cleve-
land, received \supplemental" EZ (SEZ) designation while forty-nine rejected cities were
awarded smaller enterprise communities (ECs) as consolation prizes.5 Table 1 shows sum-
mary statistics of EZ neighborhoods by city. The average Round I EZ spanned 10 square
miles, contained 113,340 people, and had a 1990 poverty rate of 48%. Most zones are con-
tiguous groupings of census tracts, although some EZs, such as the one in Chicago pictured
in Figure 1, cover multiple disjoint groupings of tracts.
EZ designation brought with it a host of scal and procedural benets, the most impor-
tant of which are the following:6
1. Employment Tax Credits |Starting in 1994, rms operating in the six original EZs
became eligible for a credit of up to 20 percent of the rst $15,000 in wages earned
in that year by each employee who lived and worked in the community. Tax credits
for each such employee were available to a business for as long as ten years, with
the maximum annual credit per employee declining over time. This was a substantial
subsidy given that, in 1990, the average EZ worker only earned approximately $16,000
in wage and salary income.
2. Title XX Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Funds |Each EZ became eligible for
$100 million in SSBG funds. These funds could be used for such purposes as: business
assistance, infrastructure investment, training programs, youth services, promotion of
home ownership, and emergency housing assistance.
Evidence from the General Accounting Oce (1999) and Hebert et al. (2001) suggests
that participation in the tax credit program was incomplete and most common among large
4All zone tracts were required to have poverty rates above twenty percent. Moreover, ninety percent of
zone tracts were required to have poverty rates of at least twenty-ve percent and fty percent were required
to have poverty rates of at least thirty-ve percent. Tract unemployment rates were required to exceed 6.3%.
The maximum population allowed within a zone was 200,000 or the greater of 50,000 or ten percent of the
population of the most populous city within the nominated area.
5ECs were not entitled to tax credits but were allocated $3 million in SSBG funds and made eligible for
tax-exempt bond nancing. SEZs were awarded block grants similar to those received by EZs but did not
become eligible for the EZ tax credit until 1999.
6See IRS (2004) for more details. Other benets appear not to have been heavily utilized. See Hebert et
al. (2001), General Accounting Oce (2004), and Government Accountability Oce (2006).
5rms who were more likely to have positive taxable income. Roughly $200 million in employ-
ment credits was claimed over the period 1994 to 2000, with the amount claimed each year
trending up steadily over time. IRS data show that, in the year 2000, close to ve hundred
corporations, and over ve thousand individuals, claimed EZ Employment Credits worth a
total of approximately $55 million.7
Table 2 summarizes information compiled from HUD's internal performance monitoring
system on the amount of money allocated to various program activities by source. By
2000, the rst round EZs had spent roughly $400 million dollars in SSBG funds. However,
large quantities of outside capital accompanied the grant spending. The six EZs reported
allocating roughly $3 billion to local projects by 2000, with more than seven dollars of outside
money accompanying every dollar of SSBG funds.8 Audits by HUD's Oce of Inspector
General9 and the Government Accountability Oce (2006) have called the accuracy of these
data into question, suggesting that they should be interpreted as loose upper bounds on the
amount of money raised, particularly since it is dicult to ascertain how any outside funds
would have been spent in the absence of the program.
In sum, the six Round I EZs constitute a 60 square mile area containing less than 700,000
residents. Federal expenditures on EZ wage credits and block grants amounted to roughly
$850 per resident over the rst six years of the program (1994-2000). And HUD's internal
records suggest that as much as $3;000 per resident of outside investment may also have been
leveraged over this period though we suspect this gure to be a substantial overestimate.
7These gures come from General Accounting Oce (2004).
8The most commonly reported use of funds was enhancing access to capital. One-stop capital shops
were a component of the plans of most EZs, training local entrepreneurs to develop business plans and
apply for loans either from local organizations or commercial banks. The second most common use of funds
was business development which involved technical and nancial assistance. Some EZs developed business
incubators for this purpose or invested in the physical revitalization of commercial corridors. See Hebert
et al. (2001) and Appendix IV of Government Accountability Oce (2006) for detailed descriptions of the
projects implemented in particular zones.
9See Chouteau (1999) and Wolfe (2003).
6II. Model
We turn now to the development of a general equilibrium model allowing a welfare analysis
of the EZ program. The framework adopted is a generalization of the classic equilibrium
models of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) extended to allow for heterogeneity, labor supply
decisions, commuting, elastic housing supply, and imperfect compliance in the EZ wage
credit program. The decisions of workers are modeled in a discrete choice framework as in
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) with an emphasis on the distinction between place of
residence and place of work as in, for example, Baum-Snow (2007). After developing the
model, we show that a set of reduced form elasticities of the sort discussed by Chetty (2009)
can be used to approximate the EZ program's deadweight loss.
Assume a continuum of agents of measure one and a nite collection N =fN0;N1g of
neighborhoods in which they may live or work consisting of neighborhoods inside (N1) or
outside (N0) of an Empowerment Zone. Neighborhoods have xed bundles of amenities
consumed by local residents and used by local rms in production. Commuting between
neighborhoods is costly. To deal with imperfect compliance with the EZ tax credit we
introduce two sectors of the economy: a rst sector of covered rms likely to participate in
the EZ wage credit program and a second sector of rms likely to be ineligible for (or unaware
of) the program. It is useful to think of sector one as consisting of large establishments and
sector two as small family run businesses.
Agents choose a neighborhood to live in, whether to work, and (if so) a neighborhood
and sector in which to work. Each agent inelastically demands a single unit of housing which
they rent at market rates. Write the utility of individual i living in community j 2 N and
working in community k 2 f;;Ng and sector s 2 f1;2g as:
uijks = wjks   rj   jk + Aj + "ijks
= vjks + "ijks
where wjks is the wage a worker from neighborhood j receives when working in sector s
7of neighborhood k, rj is the local rent level, jk is the cost associated with commuting to
work in location k given residence in j, Aj is the mean consumption value of local amenities,
and vjks is the mean utility (across individuals) of each choice. The wage for nonworkers
(w;) is the dollar value of leisure which we normalize to zero without loss of generality. We
likewise normalize j; = 0. The individual and choice specic error terms "ijks represent
heterogeneity in the valuation of local amenities, the value of leisure, tastes for work in the
two sectors, and commuting costs.10 The "ijks are independently and identically distributed
across individuals and assumed to possess a continuous multivariate distribution independent
of vjks.
Heterogeneity is substantively important as it allows some workers to be inframarginal
with respect to their residential and work location choices; thereby creating the potential for
economic rents. Traditional models of spatial equilibrium are predicated upon the absence
of such rents.11 A Rosen-Roback type model for example would start by specifying that
uijks = u. Such indierence implies that the incidence of a local subsidy cannot fall on
pre-existing residents since the supply elasticity of workers to particular locations will be
innite. Heterogeneity weakens this knife edge result and yields the possibility of nite
supply elasticities to the various residence/work alternatives.
Dene a set of indicator variables fDijksg equal to one if and only if max
j0k0s0 fuij0k0s0g = uijks
for worker i, where j0 2 N, k0 2 f;;Ng, and s0 2 f1;2g. Then the measure of agents in
each residential/work location is Njks = P (Dijks = 1jfvj0k0s0g). Denote the average utility





where the expectation operator E" is dened over the
heterogeneity terms "ij0k0s0. It can be shown12 that the choice probabilities Njks and the
10It is useful to allow for the possibility that some zone residents face a higher cost of commuting to work
inside the zone than outside the zone as might happen if some residents live on the border of the zone or
are located near public transportation more integrated with one neighborhood than another. This will allow
some zone workers to prefer working outside the zone even if wages are equalized across all neighborhoods.














j0k0s0 fuij0k0s0g = uijks

= P (Dijks = 1jfvj0k0s0g) = Njks. We
are grateful to David Card for help in simplifying an earlier version of this proof.
8average valuation V obey the following relationship,
d
dvjks
V = Njks (1)
which amounts to a generalization of Roy's Identity for a representative agent with indirect
utility function V . This relationship will prove useful in our analysis of social welfare.
We turn now to the demand side of the model. Goods are produced in each neighborhood
k and sector s with a constant returns to scale technology F (Kks;BkLks) = BkLksf (ks)
where the arguments Kks and Lks refer to total capital and labor inputs respectively, ks =
Kks
BkLks is the capital to eective labor ratio, and Bk is the local productivity level which
may depend upon infrastructure investments, natural features of the physical environment
(e.g. access to a body of water, proximity to downtown), and crime levels.13 Productivity
dierences across neighborhoods yield unequal derived demands for inputs across space.
Because the supply elasticity of workers to any given location is nite in the presence of
taste heterogeneity and commuting costs, these unequal factor demands result in unequal
wages across neighborhoods.
Workers from dierent neighborhoods are assumed to be perfect (and homogeneous)
substitutes in production so that Lks =
P
j2N
Ljks where Ljks is the labor input of workers
from neighborhood j to rms in neighborhood k and sector s.14 The EZ tax credit program
induces a cost dierence for zone rms between workers residing inside of the zone (whose
wages are subsidized at rate ) and zone commuters who are unsubsidized. Hence at any
given wage, zone employers strictly prefer zone residents, which means that at an interior
equilibrium zone rms must pay dierent wages to residents and commuters.
We assume capital is supplied at xed rental rate  to all neighborhoods and sectors and
that output is sold on an international market at price one.15 Dene the indicator variable
13See Kline (2010a) for an analysis of this sort of model when Bk exhibits agglomeration eects.
14In Supplemental Appendix A we derive an extended version of the model which incorporates productivity
dierences among workers and show that it yields similar conclusions.
15It is straightforward to extend the model to the case where output is sold locally and prices are endoge-
nous. Since we have no data on local product prices we omit this feature from our analysis.
9jks = I [j 2 N1;k 2 N1;s = 1] which equals one for jobs subject to the wage subsidy and
zero otherwise. Firms equate the marginal product of each factor to its corresponding after-
tax cost so that:
Bk [f (ks)   ksf
0 (ks)] = wjks (1   jks)
f
0 (ks) = 
The second of these conditions may be inverted to yield k;s =  = h() where h0 (:)  0.





where R() = f (h())   h() is the marginal product of a \raw" unit of labor. The fact
that zone and nonzone workers are perfect substitutes implies that the tax subsidy for zone
workers will be completely transferred into their wages. Zone jobs in the higher paying sector
are not rationed because workers have idiosyncratic tastes for working in dierent sectors.
Finally, we allow for upward sloping housing supply curves in each neighborhood as in
Moretti (2010a,b) and Notowidigdo (2010). Each neighborhood has a continuum of risk
neutral land owners distributed on the unit interval. Each land owner may develop a unit
of housing on her plot of land in neighborhood j at a cost which is continuously distributed
across owners according to the CDF Gj (:) with strictly positive support. These costs might
include the time cost of rehabilitating a boarded up vacant unit or the pecuniary cost of
creating a new structure on an open lot.
If a unit of housing is built, the owner rents the unit out and receives payo rj minus the
cost of constructing the unit, otherwise she receives nothing. Let Hj represent the number
of units rented out in community j. Optimization implies that the marginal landowner in
each neighborhood breaks even on house construction so that:
G
 1
j (Hj) = rj (3)







The model's predictions for the response of zone neighborhoods to EZ designation are
now easily derived. The EZ program involved two treatments { a wage tax credit () and
a block grant which we model as aecting local productivity (Bk) and amenity (Aj) levels.
From (2) we see that the EZ wage subsidies should raise the wages of local zone workers
and hence their employment at EZ rms in the covered sector. Because the tax credits have
no eect on wages in the uncovered sector, employment may fall at such rms as workers
switch their employment to the more lucrative covered sector. Likewise, because the wage
subsidies yield no increase in the wages of nonresident commuters their employment may
also be expected to fall slightly as some workers decide to move to the neighborhood to take
advantage of the higher wages for residents.
Any productive eect of the block grants however, may counteract these negative em-




Thus productivity changes proportionally boost the wages of all workers in a neighborhood
regardless of their place of residence. This may be expected to yield a large employment
response among nonresident zone commuters who likely view most jobs within a sector with
the same commuting distance as close substitutes. It may also counteract any negative
employment eects at smaller rms not covered by the tax credit.
Finally, depending on the distribution of workers tastes for living in zone neighborhoods
and features of the housing supply locus, the rental rate of housing in zone neighborhoods
may increase as agents seek to move to the zone in order to take advantage of higher local
wage levels and any possible increases in local amenity value. If workers have relatively ho-
11mogeneous residential preferences and the housing stock is xed we should see large increases
in rental rates, while if housing is easily supplied we should see an increase in population
and little change in rental rates. If, however, few workers are on the margin of moving to
distressed neighborhoods we should see little response in either population or rental rates.
We turn now to an analysis of the model's welfare implications. Total social welfare in
this economy is the sum of total worker utility and the utility of landlords which may now
be written compactly as follows:












the rst term giving the average (which is also the total) utility of workers and the second
the total prots of landowners.
Consider rst the block grant which we model as aecting local productivity and amenity
levels. The marginal social benet of an improvement in the local productivity level of




























where we have made repeated use of the relationship given in (1). The rst line gives the eect
of the productivity change on workers and the second line the eect on housing producers.16
A remarkable feature of this welfare calculation is that it does not include any terms of
the form
dNjks
dBm . This is a result of optimization which makes the marginal agent indierent
between alternatives despite the fact that the micro-level decision is discrete. Thus, to rst
order, the welfare implications of zone grants are the same as the implications of changing
prices on an immobile population.




dlnBk so that any increases in local wages would be
perfectly oset by increases in the local cost of living. By assumption such a model requires dV = 0.
12In an economy without behavioral responses price changes simply generate transfers
of wealth between market participants, which, in our framework, have no aggregate welfare























Njms is the total number of jobs in neighborhood m and the second line
follows from (2). Note that this is simply the total increase in output the economy would
experience due to an increase in the local productivity level if the behavior of rms, workers,
and landlords were unchanged.













Nmks is the total number of residents of neighborhood m. Again, the
intuition is that, to rst order, improving amenities in neighborhood m is equivalent to
making an in-kind transfer to an immobile population.













Thus, in contrast to the case of block grants, the total welfare eects of the wage subsidy
depend to rst order on price changes. This is because of the ad valorem nature of the
subsidy which makes the size of the transfer from the federal government to zone employers
contingent upon the base wage. So even if no rms or workers move, an increase in the wage
will increase the total transfer to the local economy.






































extra term in this expression relative to (9) constitutes the marginal deadweight loss of the
wage subsidies; it reects the fact that marginal entrants have rst order eects on program
cost even if they value the resulting net wage increases little.






















where in the second line we have assumed a constant semi-elasticity of local employment
  =
dlnNjk1
d . The eciency cost of the employment credit is proportional to   and the
local wage bill in the zone and is increasing in the square of the tax change. This formula
corresponds to the standard Harberger (1964) formula for approximating deadweight loss
with the number of jobs in the zone as the \good" being subsidized. It is also analogous to
results found in local public nance models of between-city equilibrium (e.g. Albouy, 2009)
where the local employment elasticity serves as a key input to calculations of the deadweight
loss induced by local taxes. A key dierence with such papers is that the present elasticity
depends critically upon taste heterogeneity which generates dierent conclusions regarding
program incidence.
Note that in the absence of taste heterogeneity among workers   will be large and the
employment credits will be \wasted" on workers indierent about the prospect of switching
between neighborhoods, sectors, and labor force states. If, however, few nonzone residents
14are on the margin of moving to an EZ (as might be the case if EZs are perceived by most to
be undesirable locations in which to live) and few EZ residents are on the margin of working
(as might be the case if public assistance receipt provides disincentives to work among a
large fraction of the local population) then   will be small and the deadweight loss of the
program will be small.
The block grant investments may yield additional deadweight losses if their total cost C
exceeds the value of the resulting amenity and productivity increases. Suppose every dollar
of block grants proportionally raises zone neighborhood amenity levels by a factor of a and
zone neighborhood productivity levels by b. Then we may approximate the deadweight


































where the second line follows from (7) and (8). If the block grants are wasted on unproductive
investments, as is likely if the funds are mismanaged or mistargeted relative to the needs of
local rms, the program's deadweight costs could be substantial. If, however, local public
goods are underprovided in zone neighborhoods the social return on these local investments
may dramatically exceed their cost.
III. Empirical Strategy
Our theoretical discussion highlights the point that the incidence and eciency of EZ des-
ignation are both empirical questions incapable of being answered on prior grounds. The
incidence of the program hinges critically upon the manner in which factor prices change.
Wage increases in the zone will benet workers with a preference for working in the zone
while residents who prefer to take leisure will be unaected. Rent increases will benet zone
15landlords but reduce the disposable income of zone residents. Residents outside the zone may
also reap some benet from EZ designation if the productivity of zone jobs rises or rental
rates for housing fall in response to any population losses. But the total economy wide gain
associated with the program will be small relative to its cost if workers are highly responsive
to the wage subsidies or if the block grants are wasted on unproductive investments.
Our empirical tasks, then, are threefold. First, we must identify the impact of EZ desig-
nation on local price levels in order to assess the program's incidence. Second, to compute
an estimate of deadweight loss due to the program's tax credits, we need to determine  
which corresponds to the eect of the wage subsidies on the number of zone jobs for zone
residents. Third, we need to isolate the cost eectiveness of the block grants which will
require determining the impact of EZ designation on the wages of nonresident zone workers,
who according to (5) should experience wage increases in proportion to any productivity
increases dBk. With knowledge of dlnBk and information on the cost C of the EZ invest-
ments we may in turn identify b. Note that without more assumptions the model does not
allow point identication of a from reduced form impacts alone. However, provided housing
supply is not perfectly elastic, if the impact on rents of designation is nearly zero we can be
assured that a is very small as well. We return to this issue again in Section VII.
Our research design for accomplishing these tasks will be to compare the experience over
the 1990s of census tracts in Round I EZs to tracts in rejected and later round zones with
similar characteristics.17 This approach has a number of advantages. First, tracts in rejected
zones, like those in winning zones, were nominated by their local governments for inclusion in
an EZ proposal. If the nomination process was similar in winning and losing cities this ought
to yield a set of control tracts with both observable and unobservable characteristics similar
to EZs. Second, our control zones consist of contiguous clusters of poor census tracts just like
real EZs. If spillovers exist across census tracts or if poor tracts surrounded by other poor
tracts have important unmeasured characteristics then such agglomerated controls may be
17Use of rejected applicants as controls as a means of mitigating selection biases has a long history in the
literature on econometric evaluation of employment and training programs. See the monograph by Bell et
al. (1995) for a review.
16necessary for identifying causal eects. Finally, the majority of rejected and future zones are
located in dierent cities than treated zones which reduces the sensitivity of our estimates
to geographic spillover eects.
Though the use of rejected tracts as controls has many advantages, one may still be
concerned that the cities that won rst round EZs are fundamentally dierent from losing
cities. A cursory inspection of Table 1 indicates that two of the three largest US cities
won EZs, while the remaining winners are large manufacturing intensive cities. If large
cities experienced fundamentally dierent conditions over the 1990s than small cities, the
comparison of observationally equivalent census tracts in winning and losing zones will be
biased.
To further explore this possibility we conduct a number of robustness tests aimed at
assessing the credibility of our dierences-in-dierences research design. First, we construct
a set of \placebo zones"in treated cities with characteristics similar to real zones. If our
research design is confounded by city wide shocks we should nd nonzero eects on these
placebo zones as well. Second, we examine how the outcomes of EZ tracts change in the
city-wide distribution of tract level outcomes relative to controls. This approach, which
is a nonparametric variant of the traditional dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences (DDD)
research design, is robust to arbitrary rank preserving city specic shocks.
Econometric Methods
In our comparison of EZ neighborhoods to tracts in rejected and future zones we will rely
on simple generalizations of standard dierences-in-dierences estimators. To motivate this
approach we develop here a statistical model of census tract behavior and EZ assignment
based upon the theoretical model of Section II.
Let Ytzc be the change in some outcome (e.g. log population) over the 1990s in census
tract t of proposed zone z in city c. Taking census tracts as the relevant denition of neigh-
borhoods, our theoretical model suggests that such changes are the result of the introduction
17of zone specic labor subsidies z and shifts over time in the local amenity (Atzc) and produc-
tivity (Btzc) levels of all tracts in the city. To reduce the state space, we assume that tract
level outcomes depend only on city-wide averages Ac and Bc of these quantities and local
distance weighted averages An(t) and Bn(t) among tracts within a radius-based neighborhood
n(t) of census tract t.












where the random coecients a1
t through a5
t represent the potentially heterogeneous tract-
level responses to these exogenous factors. Let Tz be an indicator for whether zone z is
designated as an EZ. To model the impact of designation we assume that An(t) = A0
n(t)+
a
tTz, Bn(t) = B0
n(t)+b
tTz and z = EZTz where A0
n(t) and B0
n(t) are the changes in
local amenity and productivity levels a tract would experience in the absence of treatment,
a
t and b
t are the incremental amenity and productivity impacts of EZ designation, and
EZ is the EZ employment tax credit.
Let Pc be a vector of mean city-level characteristics and Xt a vector of tract level proxies
for trends in local productivity and amenities. Dene Xn(t) as a distance weighted average
of those tract level covariates within a given radius-based neighborhood n(t) of tract t. We


























where the proxy errors c and etzc are unobserved city-wide and tract specic shocks to
productivity and amenities that would have occurred in the absence of treatment. Using
18this notation we may now write:






p + c + etzc (12)





tEZ represents the potentially het-
erogeneous reduced form eect of EZ designation mediated through changes in local taxes,
amenities, and productivity levels. This heterogeneity may arise either from neglected non-
linearities in the reduced form (as captured by randomness in the at coecients) or spatially




EZs are assumed to have been assigned based upon the mean characteristics Xz of the
zone and features Pc of the city as follows:18






p + zc > 0] (13)




. This is a strong
assumption which we will later test with a number of robustness exercises.






which, given the usual regularity conditions, is sucient to ensure that the parameters
(x;p) are identied via a tract-level regression of Ytzc on Xn(t) and Pc in the sample of
untreated tracts.
18The assumption that it is the mean characteristics of the zone that inuence designation is not as
restrictive as might be thought since Xt may include indicator functions (e.g. a dummy for tract poverty
less than 20 %) and polynomial terms.






















19The average treatment eect on the treated (ATT) may be written:
  E [tzcjTz = 1]
We consider two estimators of this quantity, each of which rely on dierent assumptions
about the nature of treatment eect heterogeneity. Under the rst approach we assume tzc




in which case E [tzcjTz = 1] = E [tzc] and we may




= 0. It is straightforward to verify in this
case that, subject to the usual regularity conditions, OLS estimation of (12) on the pooled
sample of tracts identies .




to be an arbitrary real valued function.
We construct an estimator of the ATT by observing that (14) implies:







This suggests that  may be estimated by a two-step procedure where in a rst step x
and p are estimated via an OLS regression of Ytzc on Xn(t) and Pc in the sample of
untreated tracts and in a second step the predicted values from this regression are used to
form counterfactual mean estimates X0
n(t)b x +P 0
cb p for each treated tract. An estimate of 




















is the number of treated tracts. This expression is simply the mean prediction error among
treated tracts of a regression model estimated on controls.
In practice, we implement this parametric reweighting (PW) procedure in a single step
via an interacted regression described in Appendix I. Kline (2010b) shows that this estimator,
which is a variant of the classic Blinder-Oaxaca approach to measuring wage gaps, is equiv-
20alent to a propensity score reweighting estimator with weights derived from a log-logistic
propensity score model. We use these parametric weights in the next section to assess the
extent to which our regression model is able to balance the distribution of covariates across
treatment and control samples over time.
The presence of a random eect c in (12) suggests the need to account for within city
spatial correlation in the errors when conducting inference. Because we have only six treated
zones, standard cluster-robust variance estimation methods relying upon rst order asymp-
totics may yield poor control over the probability of making type I errors. To deal with this
problem we use a clustered wild bootstrap-t procedure explored in Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller (2008) which has been found to yield dramatic improvements in the performance of
cluster-robust methods in small samples. We conduct a Monte Carlo study, presented in
Supplemental Appendix B, demonstrating that this procedure eectively controls the size of
Wald tests for both the OLS and PW estimators in a variety of data generating processes
mimicking the design of our data.
IV. Data
Our analysis relies upon three decades worth of condential household and establishment
level microdata from the Decennial Census, the Standard Statistical Establishment List
(SSEL), and the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) which we have geocoded to the level
of the 1990 Census tract. Appendix II provides information on sample selection, construction
of the geocodes, and variable denitions.
In order to construct a suitable control group for EZs, we obtained 73 of the 78 rst
round EZ applications submitted to HUD by nominating jurisdictions via a Freedom of
Information Act request. These applications contain the tract composition of rejected zones
which we merged with publicly available data on the tract composition of future zones to
create a composite set of controls for use in our analysis. Appendix Table A1 details the
composition of the cities in our evaluation sample, whether they applied for a Round I EZ,
21and the treatments (if any) they received.
Table 3 shows average characteristics of EZ and control tracts. Our analysis focuses on
the six original EZs which received both tax credits and block grants and restricts the sample
of controls to zones containing at least 10 census tracts in cities with population greater than
100,000.20 We also drop all control tracts with 1990 poverty and unemployment rates below
the minimum thresholds specied in the EZ eligibility criteria.21 This yields a baseline
estimation sample of 234 EZ tracts in six cities and 1,429 controls distributed across sixty
nine cities.
While the residents of rejected and future zones are poor and have high rates of unem-
ployment we see from columns one and two of Table 3 that they are not quite as poor or
detached from the labor force as residents of EZ areas. It is also clear that working residents
of EZ neighborhoods are, on average, less likely to work in the zone than residents of rejected
and future zones. This is primarily due to the fact that EZs tend to be in larger cities which
simply have more census tracts to which an individual may commute in a short amount of
time.
To nd a more comparable subset of controls we estimate a logistic propensity score model
at the tract level explaining EZ designation as a function of the 1980 and 1990 values of a
number of dierent tract and city characteristics measured in the Census along with a number
of tract-level variables measured in the 1987 and 1992 waves of the LBD. Coecients on the
variables used in the propensity score model are given in Appendix Table A2. Because some
of our controls are lagged values of outcomes we wish to investigate via regression based
methods, we construct our tract level covariates Xn(t) (which are kernel weighted spatial
averages) omitting the actual tract level outcome Xt in order reduce the threat of division
bias (Borjas, 1980) in our later results.22
20Census tracts in the two SEZs are dropped from our baseline analysis because they were not eligible
for wage tax credits during our sample period. We also drop the Washington, DC Enterprise Zone (EnZ)
from our sample because it received a wage tax credit but not block grants and hence cannot be properly
characterized as an EZ or a control.
21Zone tracts were required to have poverty rates in excess of 20% and unemployment rates in excess of
6.3% as measured in the 1990 Census.
22See Appendix II for more on the construction of the Xn(i).
22Figure 2 plots the distribution of estimated propensity scores above 0.05 among treated
and control units. Though it is not visible on the histogram, approximately 20% of the
control tracts have estimated propensity scores below the minimum value found among the
EZ tracts. To deal with this failure of overlap in the two distributions we drop tracts with
propensity scores less than the minimum value found among the treated units and those with
propensity scores greater than 0.9 as recommended in Crump et al. (2009). This shrinks our
estimation sample to 232 EZ tracts and 1,088 controls distributed across sixty four cities.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the results of reestimating the same propensity score
model on this trimmed sample of tracts.
The third column of Table 3 shows that trimming the sample does not substantially
change the average characteristics of the EZ tracts. However, we see from the fourth column
of Table 3 that the mean characteristics of the control group do change in a manner making
the two groups substantially more comparable. The fth column of Table 3 uses the regres-
sion based weights, described in Kline (2010b) and in Appendix I, to reweight the controls
in this trimmed sample to mimic the covariate distribution of the treated observations using
the same covariates as the earlier logit. After reweighting, the rst two moments of tract
characteristics exhibit dramatically improved balance despite the fact that the majority of
these variables were not included in the weighting procedure.23
Figure 3 shows the mean behavior of the EZ and control tracts before and after reweight-
ing across the three decades in our sample. After trimming is applied to the pooled set of
controls their history over the past two decades mirrors that of actual Empowerment Zones
remarkably well. One can actually see most of our results from these graphs themselves. A
number of key labor market outcomes (total employment, log wages of zone workers, and
log wages of zone resident workers) seem to have improved in EZ neighborhoods relative
to reweighted controls over the 1990s indicating a substantial boost to local labor demand.
Also noticeable however is the absence of a discernable impact on population or housing
rents. We discuss this nding in more detail in the next section.
23See also Appendix Tables A3.a and A3.b where we document balance on other covariates (including
pre-treatment trends) and on other moments of the marginal distribution of covariates.
23V. Results
We turn now to our dierences-in-dierences estimates of the impact of EZ designation. We
conne our attention to the trimmed sample of tracts where simple linear adjustments are
most likely to be valid. To deal with the hierarchical nature of our data we report wild
bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the city level and percentile-t tests of the null
of no-eect as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008).24 Because the empir-
ical bootstrap distributions of our test statistics may be asymmetric and/or leptokurtotic
our bootstrap standard errors and p-values occasionally move in opposite directions across
specications.
Table 4 presents estimates of the impact of EZ designation on economic activity in EZ
neighborhoods as measured in the LBD. Column 1 reports simple dierences-in-dierences
estimates which yield large (10%) positive eects on the number of jobs and small insignif-
icant eects on the number of establishments and average earnings per worker. Column 2
shows that after adjusting the dierences-in-dierences estimates for covariate imbalance via
OLS the estimated impact on jobs increases to 13% and becomes more precise. Column 3
gives the results of our regression based reweighting estimator which yields even larger jobs
impacts. The tendency for covariate adjustment to increase the point estimates suggests
that EZs were awarded to economically declining neighborhoods.
The second panel of Table 4 computes impacts on rms located in the zone in 1992.
This attenuates the estimated job impacts suggesting that some of the overall employment
impact is due to rm births. The negative impacts on the number of establishments in this
restricted sample indicate that designation may have also increased rm death rates.25 The
bottom two panels of the table break impacts down by 1992 establishment size. Though
the estimates are quite noisy, we nd that employment increased only at establishments
that were already large in the 1992 economic census. These ndings are consistent with the
24See Supplemental Appendix B for details.
25The net impacts in the rst panel suggest the eect on births is larger than the corresponding eect on
deaths.
24survey evidence in Hebert et al. (2001) that large rms were more likely to take advantage
of the tax credits and suggest an important role for this feature of the program.
Table 5 provides estimates of the number of jobs created based upon the Journey to
Work component of the Decennial Census. The point estimates are extremely stable across
specications with an estimated increase of 18%-19%. These gures are in line with, though
slightly larger than, the corresponding LBD based estimates in Table 4. In Supplemental
Appendix C we show that employment increased more in zone industries with a larger 1990
employment share of local workers, providing additional evidence that the tax credits were
likely an important source of the jobs impacts.
By crossing Census questions on place of work with place of residence we can in principle
determine who occupied any jobs that were created. The second panel of Table 5 reports the
results of this exercise. Though all specications nd that the largest employment increases
in the zone occurred among zone residents, the magnitude and precision of the results vary
with the specication used. Employment of non-resident commuters seems to have increased
by nearly the same proportion as local residents suggesting the wage credits are unlikely to
be the only source of increased labor demand in the zones.
Table 6 provides estimates of the impact of EZ designation on the log hourly wages of
individuals broken down by place of residence and place of work. To remove the inuence of
changes in neighborhood composition over time we also report results where the wages have
been regression adjusted for individual characteristics at the micro-level via a procedure
described in Appendix II. We label the impact on the dierence between adjusted and
unadjusted wages a third \composition"eect, providing the change in wages that would be
expected due solely to changes in the composition of the workforce.
Though all of our point estimates suggest modest wage increases for zone residents, we
lack the power to reject the null hypothesis of no eect except in our OLS specication. Ad-
justing for individual characteristics has little eect other than to slightly increase precision.
No detectable wage eects are present for zone workers as a whole. However because only
25roughly 10% of zone workers are zone residents,26 it is important to further disaggregate
these estimates.
The bottom panel of Table 6 provides wage impacts broken down jointly by place of
residence and place of work. Here we nd large wage increases among zone residents who
work in the zone of more than 12%. These eects are in part due to changes in composition
which appear to have increased the predicted wage of local workers by roughly 5%. But
even after accounting for composition the wages of local workers increased by approximately
8%. We also nd in some specications that the wages of resident commuters increased
which may reect spillovers in the demand for labor across zone boundaries. Non-resident
commuters exhibit small and insignicant wage increases suggesting that the elasticity of
supply of commuter labor to the zone is very large.
Table 7 examines the impact of EZ designation on the housing market and population.
As in Table 6, we use the Census microdata to construct adjusted estimates that hold
tract dwelling characteristics constant over time.27 Owner occupied housing values exhibit
dramatic increases of approximately a third across all specications and samples. Rental
rates on the other hand exhibit no perceptible increase. Adjusting for building characteristics
has little eect on the estimates.
This large discrepancy between rental rates and housing values is troublesome. We
suspect it reects the fact that owner occupied housing values are self-reported in the Census.
If slum housing markets are relatively illiquid, residents may not know whether (or by how
much) designation has changed the value of their residence. An alternative explanation is
that they are pricing in expected future increases in the attractiveness of the neighborhood
which have yet to materialize and may or may not be overly optimistic.
The remaining results of Table 7 call the interpretation of the housing value estimates
further into question. Neither total tract population nor the number of zone households
seem to have been aected by zone designation. We also fail to nd an appreciable eect on
26See Table 10.
27See Appendix II for details on our adjustment procedure.
26the fraction of housing units that are vacant. Finally, if rents or other local prices increased
substantially one would expect outmigration rates to rise as lower skilled groups are priced
out of the neighborhood. Yet Table 7 nds no evidence of an impact on the fraction of
households living in the same house as ve years ago.
Overall, these ndings suggest that EZ designation created jobs in zone neighborhoods,
that both zone and nonzone residents obtained employment in these neighborhoods that
would not have otherwise been available, and that earnings increased substantially for zone
residents. We nd no evidence of important increases in the local cost of living or popula-
tion. These results suggest that while commuting patterns are relatively sensitive to changes
in incentives, the residential choices of workers are quite rigid, presumably because zone
neighborhoods are poor substitutes for less distressed areas. The evidence also suggests an
important role for both the wage credit and block grant features of the EZ program which
appear to have disproportionately raised employment at large rms, raised wages among
local workers, and still raised the employment of nonresident commuters by nearly as much
as local residents.
VI. Robustness
If unmeasured factors correlated with the future performance of neighborhoods inuenced
the process by which zones were awarded our estimates will be biased. To address such
concerns, we now perform two tests of the assumptions underlying our research design.
Our rst test is to create a series of \placebo" zones in treated cities and compare their
performance over the 1990s to that of future and rejected tracts using our dierences-in-
dierences estimators. A nding of nonzero treatment eects in this sample would suggest
that our analysis is confounded by city specic shocks. In order to construct the placebo
zones we estimated a pooled propensity score model for all tracts in treated cities (see
Appendix IV for details) and then performed nearest neighbor propensity score matching
without replacement in each city, choosing exactly one control tract for each treated EZ
27tract. This yields a set of placebo zones of the same size and with approximately the same
census characteristics as each real EZ.
The placebo tracts tend to be geographically clustered in much the same way as actual
EZs, reecting the underlying spatial correlation of many of the covariates used in the anal-
ysis. One potentially troublesome feature of the placebo zones however is that they tend to
be located near actual EZ tracts. If EZ designation did in fact have an impact, the eects
may have spilled over into adjacent communities. For this reason we impose the restriction
that placebo tracts be at least one mile from the nearest EZ tract.
Table 8 shows the results of applying our dierences-in-dierences estimators to a trimmed
sample of placebo tracts where the trimming has been conducted on an estimated propensity
score of the same form as that used in Section V of the paper. After reweighting, none of the
outcomes register statistically signicant dierences across placebo and control zones, save
for the fraction in the same house as ve years ago which exhibits a modest positive eect.
However, no systematic pattern is apparent from the placebo point estimates as a whole.
As a second check on our research design we convert the outcome variables to scaled within
city ranks.28 If our results are merely picking up city specic shocks then the rank of an
average EZ tract in its city wide distribution of poverty rates, for example, should not change
over the 1990s relative to the rank of a similar rejected tract in its city-wide distribution. We
scale our ranks by the number of tracts in each city so that the transformed outcomes can
be thought of as percentiles which are comparable across cities of dierent absolute size.29
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 8 show the results of applying the three dierences-in-
dierences estimators to the transformed outcomes in the trimmed sample. The point esti-
mates represent the average impact of EZ designation on the percentile rank of EZ neigh-
28In a previous version of this paper we experimented with a reweighted dierence-in-dierences-in-
dierences (DDD) estimator that sought to nd within city controls for both actual and rejected EZ tracts.
This estimator performed quite poorly severely failing a number of robustness tests. This poor performance
was caused by diculties in nding suitable control tracts in rejected cities. We believe the following per-
centile rank approach to be a much more transparent and robust approach to making within city comparisons.
29In other words, for any outcome Ytzc in tract t of zone z in city c, we form a new outcome e Ytzc =
rankc (Ytzc)=Nc where rankc is the track rank (the lowest value receives rank 1, the highest rank Nc) of Ytzc
in the city wide distribution of the variable in that year and Nc is the number of tracts in the relevant city.
28borhoods. For example, Column 5 indicates that EZ designation led EZ neighborhoods to
rise, on average, 2 percentiles in the within city distribution of jobs per worker. The results
are in agreement with the ndings of Tables 4-7 which we take as evidence that our prior
results are unlikely to have been generated by spurious correlation with city wide trends.
Finally, Table 9 provides impact estimates in three alternative estimation samples. The
rst sample relies entirely upon rejected round I applicants for controls and hence discards
later round zones. The second sample drops New York city which may have been subject to
dierent shocks during the sample period. The third sample adds the two SEZs (Cleveland
and Los Angeles) to the sample. Much the same pattern of results is present in each sample
though the statistical signicance of the estimates varies in ways that reect the dierences
in sample size.
VII. Welfare Analysis
Our empirical analysis suggests that EZ designation generated important changes in local
price levels and behavior. The model developed in Section II provides a framework for
assessing the welfare consequences of these changes. We begin by considering the incidence
of EZ designation on program stakeholders. Derivations analogous to those in (6) reveal that


































where dlnwlocal is the average impact on the wages of zone resident workers, dlnwcommute
is the corresponding impact on non-resident commuters, dlnAEZ is the average increase in
zone amenities, dlnrNEZ is the average impact on rental rates of housing outside of the zone,
and dlnrEZ is the average impact on rental rates of housing inside the zone.
29Hence, to rst order, the program's benets may be measured as: a) the total earnings
increase for zone resident workers, b) the earnings increase for non-resident commuters, c)
the value of any improvements in local amenities, and d) the value of any rent reductions
that occur outside the zone due to population decreases. These benets to workers are oset
by any increases in the cost of living in the zone which may be measured in terms of the
total zone rental cost. Our estimates suggest little eect on population or rents inside the
zone so we assume for simplicity that zone amenities and rents outside the zone were both
unaected by designation (dlnAEZ = dlnrNEZ  0). Note that these assumptions provide
a lower bound estimate of the benets of EZ designation.
Table 10 provides calculations converting our treatment eect estimates from Section
V into eects on totals corresponding to the terms in (16). Approximately 52;000 zone
residents worked in EZs in 2000 with a payroll of roughly $1B. Our estimate of the program's
impact on the wages of local residents is roughly eight percent which translates into an
$80M increase in annual earnings for zone residents who work in the zone.30 This gure is
near the $55M in wage credits disbursed in 2000. Note, however, that it is possible for the
wages of zone residents to rise by more than the total amount of credits if the block grants
were productive. Though imprecise, our point estimates of the impact of the program on
the wages of nonresident zone workers (and the corresponding impacts on employment of
nonresident commuters) suggest that such eects may have been present. Averaging our
PW and OLS estimates yields a 2:9% increase in the wages of nonresident EZ workers in
response to designation. There were roughly 538;000 such workers in 2000 with total annual
earnings of $20B, hence these wage increases yielded roughly $580M in additional annual
earnings for zone commuters. We also found an impact on the wages of the roughly 194;000
zone residents who in 2000 lived in the zone but worked elsewhere. An average increase of
5:7% in this group's hourly wages yields roughly $240M in additional annual earnings.
Potentially osetting these increases in the wage are small estimated increases in housing
rents. Averaging our OLS and PW results yields an estimated 1:9% increase in adjusted rents.
30Our results are in log points. We compute impacts relative to 2000 levels for expositional ease. Similar
results obtain if we take 1990 levels as the base.
30Approximately 243;000 EZ households rented their dwellings in 2000 with total annual rental
payments of $1:2B. Our estimated rent increases are equivalent to an aggregate transfer from
renting residents to landlords of $23M per year. An additional 70;000 EZ residents own their
homes which were in aggregate worth $7:9B in 2000. Both estimation strategies suggest an
increase in housing values of approximately one third, which amounts to $2:7B in additional
wealth.
Our scepticism of the housing value results and the imprecision of many of the point
estimates leads us to also consider two alternative scenarios. In the rst, the housing value
impacts are cut by two thirds and the rent estimates are tripled. In the second the wage
impact on nonresident commuters is also set to zero. This last scenario is the least favorable
to the EZ program with landlords capturing $68M of the $80M in increased earnings for
local workers. Yet even a housing wealth eect one third the size of our point estimates
suggests a windfall of $909M to local homeowners. Moreover, from (7) and (9), we see that
the total benet of the program (ignoring any amenity improvements) is well approximated
by the total increase in zone earnings which we estimate at $320M per year. Spread over
six years this is remarkably close to our estimates of the program's cost.
We turn now to an analysis of the program's deadweight loss. Our estimates from Table
5 indicate that EZs generated a roughly 15% increase in the number of zone jobs for zone
residents. Unfortunately, this estimate is quite noisy. We cannot for example reject the
null hypothesis that the program yielded a ten percent increase in the number of zone jobs
for zone residents. Moreover our large estimated impact on employment of nonresident
commuters suggests some of this eect may be the result of the block grants rather than tax
credits. It is useful then to supplement our estimates with auxiliary sources of information.
Recall that $55M in wage credits was disbursed to EZ rms in 2000. The maximum
allowable credit per worker is $3,000, so let us suppose that $2,500 was claimed on the
average worker. This yields 22;000 workers on whom the credit was claimed { roughly
forty percent of the local workforce. A 1999 General Accounting Oce survey found that
among rms making use of the wage tax credit, a third indicated that the credits were \very
31important" or \extremely important" for the hiring decision.31 Suppose then that one third
of the credits claimed resulted in jobs that would not otherwise have occurred. This yields
an impact of 7;333 jobs { approximately a fourteen percent increase which is nearly the
same as our estimates from Table 5.
Using this estimate we can compute the jobs semi-elasticity as   = :14
:2 = 0:7.32 Plugging
this number into (10) yields an estimated deadweight loss associated with the employment
tax credit of 1
2  :7  0:2  $55M = $3:85M or roughly seven percent of the ow cost
of the subsidy.33 We consider this gure a substantial overestimate since the zone wage
credit should oset pre-existing payroll taxes and hence, to some extent, actually reduce the
amount of distortion in hiring decisions.
As noted in Section II, the block grants accompanying EZ designation may yield either
a deadweight loss or a net welfare gain depending upon how eectively they were spent.
We have already assumed that EZs had no eect on amenity levels so we set a = 0 in
(11). Roughly C = $400M worth of federal block grants was invested in zone neighborhoods
over the sample period. Averaging across models, we found a three percent increase in the
wages of nonresident commuters which in the context of our model implies dlnBEZ = 0:031.







consisted of approximately 600;000 workers in 2000 with
approximately $21B in annual earnings. This means that the block grants yielded 0:031 
$21B = $660M in additional earnings per year. Assuming a social discount rate of ten
percent yields an annuitized value for this earnings stream of $6:6B which dwarfs the $400M
cost of the block grants. In the notation of the model this implies b = $6:6B
$400M = 16:5 so that
every dollar invested yields a discounted societal gain of $16:5. Allowing the eects of the
block grant to gradually depreciate over time does little to mitigate this conclusion. One
31See Table III.1 of General Accounting Oce (1999).
32This gure is substantially smaller than the intra-metropolitan job elasticity estimates surveyed by
Bartik (1991). A potential explanation for this discrepancy is that these tax credits are tied to residence in
distressed neighborhoods which the bulk of workers nd relatively undesirable.





Njk1wjk1 is the size of the aggregate subsidy when
rms are able to claim a credit of 20% on the wage bill of every covered worker.
32could also include the outside funds that seem to have been crowded into the program in
the cost, raising the gure spent to as much as $3B.34 We still reach the conclusion that the
block grant benets exceed the costs by a factor of two (b = 2:2).
It is clear, however, that our estimates of the local productivity increase are quite noisy.
It is interesting then to compute the productivity increase that would be necessary for the
block grant investments to break even. If one works with a program cost of $400M and a
discount rate of ten percent, the breakeven productivity increase would be approximately
0:2% { a number we cannot reject but which is less than one tenth of our preferred point
estimates. With a program cost of $2B the breakeven increase would be roughly 1%. Hence,
we interpret the weight of the evidence as suggesting that the local investments generated by
the block grants yielded benets larger than the program's cost though we lack the statistical
power to be condent in this conclusion.
VIII. Conclusion
Our comparison of EZ neighborhoods to rejected and future tracts revealed important im-
pacts of EZ designation on local price levels and behavior. Designation resulted in large
increases in zone employment which were accompanied by increases in the wages of zone
residents, particularly those living and working in the zone. These changes in the zone labor
market appear not to have been accompanied by dramatic changes in the housing market.
Population and housing rents remained roughly constant. Though we nd large increases in
the price of owner occupied housing we suspect the magnitude of these results may be more
a reection of the manner in which housing value data is collected in the Census than a sign
of dramatic windfalls to zone landlords.
The conclusion of our welfare analysis has been twofold. First, the EZ program success-
fully transferred income to a small spatially concentrated labor force with relatively little
34This is an upper bound both because it is unlikely that $3B was actually spent (see Section I) and
because alternative uses of the money crowded in are unlikely to have yielded dollar for dollar improvements
in social welfare.
33deadweight loss. Whether it makes sense, on equity grounds, to target transfers to workers
who prefer to live and work in poor places is beyond the scope of this paper. We caution
however that larger interventions may well raise local price levels in which case the gains of
local workers will be oset by losses among the many zone residents not in the labor force,
many of whom may be living on xed incomes.
Second, we found that a proper reckoning of the social return to the EZ program hinges
critically on the ecacy of the local block grants. Our point estimates indicate the block
grants paid for themselves many times over by raising local productivity, as might be ex-
pected if public goods were, for some reason, initially underprovided in these communities.
Unfortunately, the imprecision of our estimates makes this conclusion quite tentative.
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EZ         
Poverty       
Rate in EZ
Unemp. Rate in 
EZ
EZ Area      
(sq. miles)
Atlanta 395,337 37 43,792 58 20 8.1
Baltimore 736,014 13 72,725 42 16 7.1
Chicago 2,783,484 3 200,182 49 28 14.3
Detroit 1,027,974 7 106,273 47 28 19.5
New York 7,320,621 1 204,625 42 18 6.3
Philadelphia 1,594,339 5 52,440 50 23 4.3
Source: 1990 Decennial Census and HUD
SSBG Outside Money Total
Total (in million $): 386 2,848 3,234
Expenditure by category
(in million dollars):
Access to Capital 83 1,483 1,566
Business Assistance 56 482 538
Workforce Development 48 49 97
Social Improvement 76 163 240
Public Safety 18 255 272
Physical Development 14 82 97
Housing 71 326 397
Capacity Improvement 20 7 27
Average annual expenditure (in $):
Access to Capital per firm 20,881
Business Assistance per firm 7,172
Workforce Development per unemployed 261
Social Improvement per housing unit 138
Public Safety per person 56
Physical Development per poor person 44
Housing per housing unit 229
Capacity Improvement per EZ 891,295
Source: HUD PERMS data, Brashares (2000), and Decennial Census
TABLE 1: 1990 CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRST ROUND EMPOWERMENT ZONES (EZ)








[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Mean (census tracts)
Log(Jobs) -- LBD 5.742 6.265 5.751 6.188 5.952
Log(Establishments) --LBD 3.058 3.479 3.062 3.399 3.157
Log(Earnings Per Worker) --LBD 9.791 9.774 9.788 9.770 9.749
Log(Jobs) -- JTW 6.577 6.966 6.578 6.911 6.793
Log(Hourly Wage) -- JTW 2.037 1.943 2.036 1.948 1.965
Employment Rate 0.366 0.438 0.365 0.429 0.379
Unemployment Rate 0.241 0.182 0.241 0.190 0.216
Poverty Rate 0.480 0.424 0.481 0.431 0.461
Log(Population) 7.773 7.887 7.771 7.891 7.860
Prop. Black 0.739 0.610 0.739 0.649 0.747
Prop. Latino 0.180 0.163 0.179 0.176 0.176
Prop. College 0.067 0.077 0.067 0.072 0.059
Prop. High school dropouts 0.316 0.275 0.317 0.284 0.311
Prop pop. age 65+ 0.126 0.119 0.126 0.118 0.126
Prop. pop. age <18 0.306 0.310 0.306 0.312 0.310
Prop. of HHs with public assistance 0.370 0.277 0.371 0.289 0.329
Prop. female-headed HH 0.567 0.516 0.567 0.527 0.572
Prop. Workers Travel less 20 min 0.123 0.208 0.123 0.197 0.164
Log(Rent) 5.350 5.370 5.349 5.371 5.319
Log(House Value) 10.490 10.566 10.490 10.560 10.351
Prop. Vacant Houses 0.166 0.143 0.167 0.141 0.145
Prop. In same house 0.573 0.509 0.572 0.523 0.560
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 4.715 5.271 4.720 5.279 5.255
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Non-Residents) 6.382 6.703 6.382 6.629 6.466
Log (Non-Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 6.068 6.176 6.063 6.143 5.938
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working in Zone) 1.983 1.962 1.982 1.974 2.021
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Workers) 2.330 2.255 2.330 2.268 2.305
Means (city)
Total crime / population* 100 0.099 0.105 0.099 0.103 0.099
Avg. across tracts % black 0.480 0.349 0.480 0.385 0.480
Prop. of workers in Manufacture 0.157 0.156 0.158 0.158 0.158
Prop. of workers in city government 0.065 0.046 0.065 0.050 0.065
Log(Population) 14.508 13.031 14.509 13.113 13.205
Observations (number of census tracts) 234 1429 232 1088 1088
TABLE 3: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS (1990)
Untrimmed Trimmed
Note: Covariates marked JTW are based on the Journey-to-Work component of the Decennial Census. Covariates marked as LBD come from the 
Longitudinal Business Database. All other tract level covariates come from the Census. City covariates are from the City Databook. Columns [1] and 
[2] report statistics for the complete (i.e. untrimmed) sample. Columns [3]-[5] report statistics for a sample that has been trimmed based on the 
estimated propensity score (see Section IV for details.) Columns [1] and [3] show statistics for census tracts inside EZs; columns [2] and [4] for 
control tracts in rejected or future treated areas (see Table A1 for details); column [5] shows statistics for control areas that have been parametrically 
reweighted (see Section III for details.)
39Sample
Model Naïve OLS PW
All firms [1] [2] [3]
Log (Jobs) 0.102 0.131 0.147
[0.067]* [0.057]* [0.045]*
Log (Establishments) 0.019 0.030 0.029
[0.029] [0.024] [0.018] 
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) 0.038 0.030 0.008
[0.028] [0.033] [0.014] 
All firms present in 1992
Log (Jobs) 0.021 0.055 0.079
[0.049] [0.055] [0.029]
Log (Establishments) -0.057 -0.033 -0.040
[0.032] [0.029] [0.019]
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) 0.041 0.039 0.032
[0.031] [0.030] [0.018]
<5 Employees
Log (Jobs) -0.140 -0.068 -0.048
[0.114] [0.103]   [0.056] 
Log (Establishments) -0.084 -0.054 -0.056
[0.072] [0.060]   [0.034] 
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) 0.034 0.057 0.043
[0.030] [0.044]   [0.027] 
>5 Employees
Log (Jobs) 0.058 0.086 0.110
[0.072] [0.069] [0.041]
Log (Establishments) 0.002 0.008 0.012
[0.020] [0.022] [0.011]
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) 0.022 0.014 0.008
[0.028] [0.025] [0.016]
TABLE 4: WAGE AND JOBS IMPACTS                    
(Longitudinal Business Database -LBD-)
Note: Each entry gives the 1992-2000 differences-in-differences (DD) estimate of EZ 
designation on the outcome presented in each row. All figures computed from trimmed 
estimation sample (see Section IV.) Column [1] reports DD estimate without controls; [2] 
reports the OLS DD estimate controlling for lagged city and tract level characteristics; [3] 
reports parametric reweighting DD estimates. See Appendix II.G for list of covariates. 
Standard errors are shown in square brackets and are clustered by city (64 clusters.)  Stars 
reflect significance level obtained by a clustered wild bootstrap-t procedure described in 
the appendix. Legend: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant 
at 1% level. See the Appendix and Section III for details.
40Sample
Model Naïve OLS PW
[1] [2] [3]
Log (Jobs) 0.188 0.19 0.177
[0.100]   [0.078]** [0.070]**
By place of residence and place of work
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.175 0.149 0.159
[0.111]   [0.077]*  [0.064]  
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Non-Residents) 0.158 0.143 0.127
[0.083]* [0.060]*  [0.056]**
Log (Non-Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.059 0.069 0.059
[0.074]   [0.070]   [0.055]  
TABLE 5: EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS                              
(Census, Journey-to-Work -JTW-)
Note: Each entry gives the 1990-2000 differences-in-differences (DD) estimate of EZ designation on 
the outcome presented in each row.  All figures computed from trimmed estimation sample (see 
Section IV.) Column [1] reports DD estimate without controls; [2] reports the OLS DD estimate 
controlling for lagged city and tract level characteristics; [3] reports parametric reweighting DD 
estimates. See Appendix II.G for list of covariates. Standard errors are shown in square brackets and 
are clustered by city (64 clusters.) Stars reflect significance level obtained by a clustered wild bootstrap-
t procedure described in the appendix. Legend: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. See the Appendix and Section III for details.
41Sample
Model Naïve OLS PW Naïve OLS PW Naïve OLS PW
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) 0.034 0.046 0.036 0.031 0.049 0.040 0.003 -0.002 -0.004
[0.036]   [0.024]*   [0.017]   [0.035]   [0.024]*   [0.017]   [0.006]   [0.005]    [0.004]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Workers) -0.002 0.022 0.023 0.009 0.029 0.031 -0.012 -0.007 -0.009
[0.021]   [0.024]    [0.015]   [0.021]   [0.021]    [0.013]   [0.008]   [0.008]    [0.003]  
By place of residence and place of work
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working in Zone) 0.092 0.138 0.121 0.053 0.084 0.078 0.039 0.054 0.043
[0.051]*  [0.068]**  [0.047]** [0.034]   [0.039]*** [0.033]*  [0.026]   [0.033]**  [0.019]* 
Log (Hourly Wage of Non-Residents Working in Zone) -0.011 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.025 0.033 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016
[0.022]   [0.024]    [0.014]   [0.018]   [0.021]    [0.013]   [0.010]*  [0.009]    [0.005]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working Outside Zone) 0.028 0.068 0.067 0.015 0.058 0.056 0.013 0.010 0.011
[0.031]   [0.033]**  [0.017]*  [0.030]   [0.029]*   [0.016]   [0.007]*  [0.007]    [0.004]  
TABLE 6: WAGE IMPACTS                                                                                          
(Census, Journey-to-Work -JTW-) 
Unadjusted Composition-adjusted Composition Effect
Note: Each entry gives the 1990-2000 differences-in-differences (DD) estimate of EZ designation on the outcome presented in each row. All figures computed from trimmed estimation sample 
(see Section IV.) Columns [4]-[6] adjust the outcomes for demographic changes at the micro-level (see Appendix III.) Columns [7]-[9] report the results due to changes in demographic 
composition. Columns labeled "Naive" report a DD estimate without controls. Columns labeled "OLS" report the OLS DD estimate controlling for lagged city and tract level characteristics. 
Columns labeled "PW" report parametric reweighting DD estimates. See Appendix II.G for list of covariates. Standard errors are shown in square brackets and are clustered by city (64 clusters.) 
Stars reflect significance level obtained by a clustered wild bootstrap-t procedure described in the appendix. Legend: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% 
level. See the Appendix and Section III for details.
4
2Model Naïve OLS PW
[1] [2] [3]
Housing market impacts
Log (Rent) -unadjusted 0.028 0.030 0.031
[0.036]   [0.025]    [0.022]  
Log (Rent) -adjusted 0.020 0.017 0.021
[0.031]   [0.022]    [0.021]  
Log (Rent) -comp. 0.009 0.012 0.010
[0.012]   [0.010]    [0.007]  
Log (House Value) -unadjusted 0.368 0.347 0.350
[0.217]* [0.163]** [0.136]   
Log (House Value) -adjusted 0.361 0.344 0.345
[0.215]* [0.165]** [0.136]* 
Log (House Value) -comp. 0.007 0.003 0.004
[0.008]   [0.006]    [0.004]  
Population/Mobility impacts
Log (Households) -0.009 -0.004 0.009
[0.072] [0.033] [0.030] 
Log (Population) 0.006 0.027 0.038
[0.056] [0.031] [0.028] 
% Same House as Five Yrs Ago -0.001 -0.001 0.000
[0.009] [0.010] [0.006] 
% Vacant Houses 0.008 -0.005 -0.001
[0.012]   [0.009]    [0.006]  
TABLE 7: IMPACT ON HOUSING MARKET AND POPULATION
Note: Each entry gives the 1990-2000 differences-in-differences (DD) estimate of EZ designation on 
the outcome presented in each row.  All figures computed from trimmed estimation sample (see 
Section IV.)  Column [1]  reports a DD estimate without controls; [2] reports the OLS DD estimate 
controlling for lagged city and tract level characteristics. [3] reports parametric reweighting DD 
estimates. "Adjusted" outcomes controls for demographic changes at the micro-level (see Appendix 
III.) "Comp." outcomes refer to impact on the outcome due to changes in demographic composition. 
See Appendix II.G for list of covariates. Standard errors are shown in square brackets and are 
clustered by city (64 clusters.)  Stars reflect significance level obtained by a clustered wild bootstrap-t 
procedure described in the appendix. Legend: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. See the Appendix and Section III for details.
43Experiment
Model Naïve OLS PW Naïve OLS PW
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Log (Jobs) -LBD -0.036 -0.116 -0.122 0.022 0.020 0.019
[0.068] [0.096] [0.058] [0.012]* [0.008]** [0.008]**
Log (Jobs) -JTW 0.184 0.145 0.134 0.036 0.039 0.037
[0.124] [0.104] [0.079] [0.018]*   [0.018]** [0.012]***
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) -0.014 -0.009 0.003 0.048 0.033 0.019
[0.019] [0.016] [0.008] [0.028]   [0.028]   [0.014]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.038 0.018 0.010
[0.020] [0.012] [0.018] [0.022]   [0.018]   [0.011]  
Log (Establishments) -0.010 0.000 -0.002 0.007 0.000 -0.002
[0.029] [0.035] [0.025] [0.007]   [0.005]   [0.004]  
Log (Rent) -unadjusted 0.014 -0.009 -0.020 0.024 0.012 0.013
[0.041]    [0.024]    [0.013]    [0.013]*  [0.009]    [0.008]  
Log (House Value) -unadjusted 0.152 0.023 0.026 0.099 0.102 0.102
[0.104]    [0.045]    [0.050]    [0.072]*  [0.055]**  [0.045]  
Log (Households) 0.005 -0.034 -0.036 -0.009 -0.004 0.009
[0.066]   [0.045]   [0.033]   [0.071] [0.033] [0.029]
Log (Population) 0.002 -0.026 -0.030 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
[0.070]   [0.045]   [0.030]   [0.013] [0.007] [0.006]
% Same House as Five Yrs Ago 0.021 0.030 0.033 0.030 0.021 0.029
[0.013]* [0.015]** [0.012]** [0.022] [0.027] [0.014]
% Vacant Houses 0.011 0.018 0.016 -0.033 -0.057 -0.046
[0.014]    [0.016]    [0.010]    [0.029]   [0.029]*   [0.020]  
TABLE 8: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Placebo Percentile
Note: Outcomes marked JTW are based on the Journey-to-Work component of the Decennial Census. Outcomes marked as LBD come 
from the Longitudinal Business Database and are analyzed over the period 1992-2000, all other outcomes come from the Census and are 
analyzed over the period 1990-2000.  All figures computed from trimmed estimation sample (see Section IV.) Columns [1]-[3] give 
differences-in-differences (DD) estimates on a sample of untreated placebo tracts chosen by nearest neighbor matching. Columns [4]-[6] 
give DD impacts on percentile ranks of outcomes (see Section VI) in trimmed sample. Columns labeled "Naive" report a DD estimate 
without controls. Columns labeled "OLS" report the OLS DD estimate controlling for lagged city and tract level characteristics. Columns 
labeled "PW" report parametric reweighting DD estimates. See Appendix II.G for list of covariates. Standard errors are shown in square 
brackets and are clustered by city (64 clusters).  Stars reflect significance level obtained by a clustered wild bootstrap-t procedure 
described in the appendix. Legend: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. See the Appendix and 
Section III for details.
4
4Sample
Model Naïve OLS PW Naïve OLS PW Naïve OLS PW
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Log (Jobs) -LBD 0.117 0.124 0.093 0.052 0.080 0.065 0.122 0.138 0.153
[0.070]* [0.068]* [0.030] [0.042] [0.042]* [0.030] [0.056]*  [0.047]** [0.040]**
Log (Jobs) -JTW 0.227 0.240 0.191 0.211 0.202 0.213 0.190 0.193 0.175
[0.119]*  [0.110]   [0.070]** [0.119]   [0.079]** [0.078]*  [0.082]*  [0.070]*** [0.054]**
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.206 0.172 0.199 0.143 0.112 0.147 0.138 0.120 0.132
[0.115]*  [0.084]   [0.053]** [0.120]   [0.087]   [0.067]   [0.094]   [0.068]    [0.055]  
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Non-Residents) 0.208 0.209 0.158 0.167 0.150 0.148 0.172 0.170 0.146
[0.106]*  [0.107]   [0.060]*  [0.089]   [0.062]*  [0.060]** [0.067]*  [0.061]*** [0.047]**
Log (Non-Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.093 0.147 0.156 0.053 0.047 0.048 0.073 0.094 0.094
[0.073]   [0.068]** [0.052]** [0.094]   [0.069]   [0.055]   [0.062]   [0.061]    [0.045]  
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) 0.028 0.029 0.017 0.037 0.042 0.031 0.011 0.022 0.003
[0.019]  [0.022]  [0.007]  [0.038] [0.038]  [0.019] [0.026]   [0.026]   [0.013]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Workers) -0.002 0.014 0.028 0.002 0.018 0.019 -0.011 0.022 0.026
[0.032]   [0.019]   [0.016]   [0.028]   [0.027]    [0.019]   [0.018]    [0.018]    [0.011]   
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) -unadjusted 0.057 0.086 0.062 0.051 0.060 0.058 0.014 0.039 0.030
[0.046]   [0.038]*  [0.026]   [0.035]   [0.028]**  [0.023]   [0.030]    [0.021]*   [0.017]   
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) -adjusted 0.048 0.071 0.049 0.049 0.057 0.053 0.017 0.041 0.033
[0.039]   [0.035]*  [0.021]   [0.036]   [0.029]*   [0.021]   [0.028]    [0.022]*   [0.017]   
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) -comp. 0.008 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
[0.007]   [0.006]** [0.004]*  [0.006]   [0.005]    [0.004]   [0.006]    [0.004]    [0.003]   
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working in Zone) 0.054 0.157 0.145 0.090 0.146 0.136 0.071 0.118 0.115
[0.035]*  [0.068]** [0.046]** [0.053]   [0.074]*** [0.053]** [0.041]*   [0.046]*** [0.038]***
Log (Hourly Wage of Non-Residents Working in Zone) -0.010 -0.011 0.012 -0.008 -0.001 0.007 -0.019 0.009 0.019
[0.030]   [0.020]   [0.014]   [0.028]   [0.026]    [0.018]   [0.018]    [0.021]    [0.011]   
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working Outside Zone) 0.058 0.080 0.069 0.046 0.071 0.074 0.012 0.059 0.058
[0.043]   [0.030]** [0.020]** [0.032]   [0.036]*   [0.022]   [0.026]    [0.026]**  [0.015]*  
Log (Establishments) 0.025 0.029 -0.006 -0.001 0.015 0.014 0.050 0.052 0.043
[0.028] [0.036] [0.024]  [0.026] [0.024] [0.017] [0.032]*  [0.027]*  [0.018]   
Log (Rent) -unadjusted 0.029 0.041 0.058 0.021 0.011 0.014 0.005 0.024 0.032
[0.031]    [0.026]    [0.014]**  [0.041]    [0.024]    [0.020]    [0.040]    [0.023]    [0.022]   
Log (Rent) -adjusted 0.023 0.031 0.050 0.007 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.027
[0.026]    [0.029]    [0.015]*   [0.036]    [0.019]    [0.019]    [0.036]    [0.022]    [0.021]   
Log (Rent) -comp. 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.006
[0.013]    [0.006]    [0.004]    [0.014]    [0.011]    [0.008]    [0.010]    [0.008]    [0.006]   
Log (House Value) -unadjusted 0.413 0.475 0.445 0.380 0.316 0.324 0.344 0.341 0.354
[0.287]    [0.185]**  [0.153]**  [0.238]    [0.180]*   [0.155]    [0.171]*   [0.128]*** [0.104]** 
Log (House Value) -adjusted 0.411 0.473 0.439 0.372 0.306 0.311 0.338 0.343 0.353
[0.289]    [0.187]**  [0.151]**  [0.232]    [0.179]*   [0.151]    [0.166]*   [0.133]*** [0.108]** 
Log (House Value) -comp. 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.006 -0.002 0.000
[0.009]    [0.011]    [0.006]    [0.008]    [0.006]    [0.005]*   [0.009]    [0.006]    [0.005]   
Log (Households) 0.072 0.045 0.074 -0.065 -0.042 -0.053 0.026 0.017 0.025
[0.070]    [0.030]    [0.022]    [0.053] [0.031] [0.024] [0.060] [0.029]   [0.026]
Log (Population) 0.057 0.041 0.052 -0.027 -0.005 -0.011 0.027 0.033 0.042
[0.063]    [0.033]    [0.015]    [0.024] [0.029] [0.017] [0.048] [0.027]   [0.023]
% Same House as Five Yrs Ago -0.006 0.014 0.016 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.000
[0.011]    [0.008]    [0.006]    [0.012] [0.011] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008]   [0.005]
% Vacant Houses 0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.000 -0.012 -0.009 0.016 0.003 0.007
[0.011]    [0.010]    [0.007]    [0.015]    [0.013]    [0.010]    [0.012]    [0.008]    [0.007]   
TABLE 9: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS (SAMPLES)
Rejected No New York with SEZs
Note: Outcomes marked JTW are based on the Journey-to-Work component of the Decennial Census. Outcomes marked as LBD come from the Longitudinal Business Database and are analyzed 
over the period 1992-2000, all other outcomes come from the Census and analyzed over the period 1990-2000. "Adjusted" outcomes controls for demographic changes at the micro-level (see 
Appendix III.) "Comp." outcomes refer to impact on the outcome due to changes in demographic composition. Columns [1]-[3] give differences-in-differences (DD) estimates on a sample that 
includes as controls only the original tracts that were rejected by HUD in the application process. Columns [4]-[6] show DD estimates on a sample that includes the baseline sample but discards New 
York's census tracts. Columns [7]-[9] show DD estimates on a sample that includes the baseline sample and the two Supplemental EZs as treated (Los Angeles and Cleveland).Columns labeled 
"Naive"  report a DD estimate without controls. Columns labeled "OLS" report the OLS DD estimate controlling for lagged city and tract level characteristics. Columns labeled "PW" report 
parametric reweighting DD estimates. See Appendix II.G for list of covariates. Standard errors are shown in square brackets and are clustered by city.  Stars reflect significance level obtained by a 







impact of the 
program
Increase in annual 
payroll /rents/ 
housing value
 (in million $)
Average 
impact of the 
program
Increase in annual 
payroll /rents/ 
housing value
 (in million $)
Average 
impact of the 
program
Increase in annual 
payroll /rents/ 
housing value
 (in million $)
Zone Residents Working in Zone 52,000 1 8.1% 81 8.1% 81 8.1% 81
Zone Residents Working Outside Zone 194,000 4.2 5.7% 239 5.7% 239 5.7% 239
Non-Residents Working in Zone 538,000 20 2.9% 580 2.9% 580 0.0% 0
Zone Workers 590,000 21 3.1% 661 3.1% 661 0.4% 81
Zone Residents who Work  246,000 5.2 6.2% 320 6.2% 320 6.2% 320
House Renters in the Zone 243,000 1.2 1.9% 23 5.7% 68 5.7% 68
House Owners in the Zone 70,000 7.9 34.5% 2726 11.5% 909 11.5% 909
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TABLE 10: WELFARE ANALYSIS
Baseline Numbers



















Akron (Summit) x x EC-1 Louisville  x x EC-1
Albany (Dougherty) x EC-1 Lowell  x RC
Albuquerque (Bernalillo) x x EC-1 Manchester (Hillsborough) x x EC-1
Anniston x Memphis  x x RC
Atlanta x x x RC Miami  x x EC-1 EZ-2
Austin x x Milwaukee x x RC
Baltimore x x x Minneapolis  x x EC-1 EZ-2
Bellmead x EC-1 Mobile x x RC
Benton Harbor  x Monroe  x RC
Boston x EEC-1 EZ-2 Muskegon  x EC-1
Bridgeport x x EC-1 Nashville  (Davidson) x EC-1
Buffalo / Lackawanna x RC New Haven  x EC-1 EZ-2
Camden RC New Orleans  x x RC
Charleston-SC x RC New York  x x x
Charleston-WV x x Newark x RC
Charlotte (Mecklenburg) x x EC-1 Niagara Falls  RC
Chattanooga x RC Norfolk x x EC-1 EZ-2
Chester x Oakland  x x EEC-1
Chicago x x x RC Ogden  (Weber) x EC-1
Cincinnati x EZ-2 Oklahoma  City x x EC-1 EZ-3
Cleveland x SEZ-1 Omaha  (Douglas) x x EC-1
Columbia x EZ-2 Orange x
Columbus x EZ-2 Peoria  x x
Corpus Christi  x RC Philadelphia/Camden x x x RC
Cumberland EZ-2 Phoenix x x EC-1
Dallas x x EC-1 Pine  Bluff  x
Denver x x EC-1 Pittsburgh  x x EC-1
Des Moines (Polk) x EC-1 Port Arthur  x
Detroit x x x RC Portland  x x EC-1
East Chicago x x EZ-2 Portsmouth x x EC-1 EZ-2
East St Louis x x EC-1 EZ-2 Providence  x x EC-1
El Paso  x x EC-1 EZ-2 Richmond  x x
Evans x RC Rochester x x RC
Fairbanks x Sacramento  x
Flint x x RC San  Antonio  x x EC-1 EZ-3
Fort Lauderdale  x San Diego  x x RC
Fort Worth  x San Francisco  RC
Fresno x x EZ-3 Santa  Ana  EZ-2
Gary x x EZ-2 Savannah x x
Greeley x RC Schenectady  RC
Hamilton RC Shreveport  x
Hammond x x EZ-2 Sioux x
Harrisburg (Dauphin) x EC-1 Springfield (Hampden) x x EC-1
Hartford x x St.  Louis x x EC-1 EZ-2
Houston  x x EEC-1 St. Paul (Ramsey) x x EC-1
Huntington EZ-2 Steubenville x
Indianapolis (Marion) x x EC-1 Sumter x EZ-2
Ironton EZ-2 Syracuse x EZ-3
Jackson (Hinds) x x EC-1 Tacoma  x RC
Jacksonville x x EZ-3 Tampa  x EC-1
Kansas city-KS x x EEC-1 Tucson  x x EZ-3
Kansas city-MO x x EEC-1 Waco x EC-1
Knoxville x x EZ-2 Washington  x EC-1 EnZ
Lake Charles  x Whitehall x
Las Vegas (Clark) x EC-1 Wilmington (New Castle) x EC-1
Lawrence RC Yakima  RC
Little Rock (Pulaski) x x EC-1 EZ-3 Yonkers  EZ-3
Los Angeles  x x SEZ-1 RC Youngstown  x
TABLE A1: TREATMENT BY CITY
Note: Sample refers to the untrimmed sample. EZ-1 refers to cities in the treated group (Empowerment Zones in Round I in 1994). Application refers to cities that applied to get an 
EZ-1. SEZ-1 refers to cities that received a Supplemental Empowerment Zone (Round I, 1996). EC-1 refers to Enterprise Community awarded in Round I (1994), EEC-1 refers to 
Enhanced Enterprise Community awarded in Round I (1994), EZ-2 refers to Empowerment Zone awarded in Round II (2000), RC refers to Renewal Community awarded in Round 
III (2002),  EZ-3 refers to Empowerment Zone awarded in Round III (2002) and EnZ refers to the Enterprise Zone awarded in Round III (2002)
47Dep Variable: Census tract level EZ dummy Coeff. s.e.
City Covariates:
Change in log of city population 1980-1990 4.206 5.792
Change in city employment rate 1980-1990 23.951 13.457
Proportion of city population black (1990) 10.314 3.434
Total city crime / population* 100 (1990) -25.540 17.871
Proportion of city employment in manufacturing (1990) 9.790 7.430
Proportion of city employment in city government (1990) 18.747 14.286
Tract Covariates (non spatial moving average):
Indicator for Central Business District (1990) -2.221 0.516
Tract Covariates (spatial moving average):
Poverty > 25% (1990) 0.071 0.960
Poverty > 35% (1990) 1.480 0.757
Unemployment rate (1990) 1.149 3.781
Ratio of number of 1990 households with tenure > 10 years to 1980 population 0.577 0.300
Change in proportion of employed tract residents commuting < 25 minutes (1980-1990) 7.896 5.430
Change in proportion of tract workers with college degree (1980-1990) 4.136 2.236
Proportion Hispanic (1990) -0.567 5.577
Proportion Hispanic (1980) -2.115 3.027
Proportion black (1990) 3.524 2.721
Proportion black (1980) 11.125 4.739
Proportion of structures vacant (1990) 11.238 4.347
Proportion of structures vacant (1980) -15.412 6.711
Building age index (1990) 1.058 0.627
Proportion < 18 years old (1990) 0.512 8.120
Proportion < 18 years old (1980) -22.612 8.120
Proportion of households female headed (1990) -3.058 3.837
Proportion of households female headed (1980) 12.352 3.901
Proportion >= 65 years old (1990) -16.512 7.596
Proportion >= 65 years old (1980) 0.020 9.349
Proportion of population who are high school dropouts (1990) 9.707 6.090
Proportion of population who are high school dropouts (1980) 7.202 9.580
Change in mean log of housing values (1980-1990) -0.105 0.790
Change in mean log of rent (1980-1990) -1.952 2.078
Change in log of tract population (1980-1990) -1.383 1.170
Change in log of households (1980-1990) 1.128 1.827
Change in mean log wage of tract residents (1980-1990) 3.923 2.197
Change in mean log wage of tract workers (1980-1990) -4.794 1.467
Change in log of tract employment - LBD (1987-1992) 0.560 0.622
Change in log of average earnings per tract worker - LBD (1987-1992) 1.767 1.161
Change in log of number of tract establishments - LBD (1987-1992) 0.209 0.753
Intercept -10.954 4.788
Number of tracts 1663
Number of clusters (untrimmed) 69
Pseudo-R
2  0.4179
TABLE A.2: PROPENSITY SCORE MODEL
Note: City covariates are from the City Databook. Covariates marked as LBD come from the Longitudinal Business Database. All 









[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Standard Deviation (census tracts)
Log(Jobs) -- LBD 2.168 2.237 2.179 2.267 2.167
Log(Establishments) --LBD 0.856 1.124 0.862 1.085 0.975
Log(Earnings Per Worker) --LBD 0.138 0.121 0.137 0.124 0.118
Log(Jobs) -- JTW 1.455 1.527 1.467 1.498 1.428
Log(Hourly Wage) -- JTW 0.043 0.031 0.043 0.034 0.040
Employment Rate 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009
Unemployment Rate 0.013 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.007
Poverty Rate 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.018 0.018
Log(Population) 0.385 0.328 0.386 0.327 0.394
Prop. Black 0.108 0.127 0.108 0.125 0.100
Prop. Latino 0.082 0.070 0.082 0.079 0.079
Prop. College 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.003
Prop. High school dropouts 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006
Prop pop. age 65+ 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.005
Prop. pop. age <18 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009
Prop. of HHs with public assistance 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.016 0.015
Prop. female-headed HH 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.011
Prop. Workers Travel less 20 min 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.005
Log(Rent) 0.133 0.150 0.134 0.152 0.128
Log(House Value) 0.632 0.408 0.635 0.432 0.481
Prop. Vacant Houses 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.007
Prop. In same house 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.017 0.017
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.919 0.977 0.925 0.987 1.036
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Non-Residents) 1.576 1.815 1.590 1.797 1.752
Log (Non-Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.720 0.658 0.724 0.668 0.795
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working in Zone) 0.230 0.120 0.232 0.126 0.135
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Workers) 0.073 0.058 0.074 0.062 0.068
Standard Deviation (city)
Total crime / population* 100 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Avg. across tracts % black 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.037 0.030
Prop. of workers in Manufacture 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
Prop. of workers in city government 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Log(Population) 0.852 0.749 0.841 0.810 0.818
Observations (number of census tracts) 234 1429 232 1088 1088
TABLE A.3.A: SECOND MOMENTS IN 1990 TREATMENT AND CONTROLS
Untrimmed Trimmed
Note: Covariates marked JTW are based on the Journey-to-Work component of the Decennial Census. Covariates marked as LBD come 
from the Longitudinal Business Database. All other tract level covariates come from the Census. City covariates are from the City Databook. 
Columns [1] and [2] report statistics for the complete (i.e. untrimmed) sample. Columns [3]-[5] report statistics for a sample that has been 
trimmed based on the estimated propensity score (see Section IV for details.) Columns [1] and [3] show statistics for census tracts inside EZs; 
columns [2] and [4] for control tracts in rejected or future treated areas (see Table A1 for details); column [5] shows statistics for control areas 








[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Mean (census tracts)
Log(Jobs) -- LBD -0.080 -0.061 -0.081 -0.060 -0.060
Log(Establishments) --LBD -0.070 -0.053 -0.075 -0.058 -0.072
Log(Earnings Per Worker) --LBD 0.244 0.187 0.245 0.190 0.204
Log(Jobs) -- JTW -0.199 -0.124 -0.203 -0.136 -0.209
Log(Hourly Wage) -- JTW 0.404 0.378 0.402 0.378 0.393
Employment Rate 0.009 -0.013 0.009 -0.010 0.002
Unemployment Rate 0.048 0.042 0.048 0.040 0.037
Poverty Rate 0.042 0.061 0.043 0.054 0.027
Log(Population) -0.209 -0.117 -0.210 -0.131 -0.183
Prop. Black 0.025 0.035 0.025 0.029 0.015
Prop. Latino 0.018 0.023 0.018 0.022 0.019
Prop. College 0.026 0.014 0.026 0.014 0.017
Prop. High school dropouts 0.025 0.019 0.026 0.023 0.027
Prop pop. age 65+ 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.007
Prop. pop. age <18 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.023
Prop. of HHs with public assistance 0.003 0.033 0.003 0.029 0.004
Prop. female-headed HH 0.062 0.066 0.062 0.068 0.067
Prop. Workers Travel less 20 min -0.042 -0.058 -0.041 -0.057 -0.043
Log(Rent) 0.600 0.608 0.598 0.616 0.628
Log(House Value) 0.653 0.600 0.651 0.636 0.632
Prop. Vacant Houses 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.019
Prop. In same house -0.022 -0.028 -0.022 -0.027 -0.035
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) -0.184 -0.145 -0.185 -0.147 -0.157
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Non-Residents) -0.149 -0.101 -0.152 -0.113 -0.198
Log (Non-Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) -0.146 -0.057 -0.147 -0.061 -0.103
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working in Zone) 0.378 0.431 0.379 0.427 0.455
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Workers) 0.440 0.479 0.441 0.480 0.483
Means (city)
Total crime / population* 100 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.012 0.010
Avg. across tracts % black 0.060 0.052 0.061 0.055 0.065
Prop. of workers in Manufacture -0.070 -0.061 -0.070 -0.065 -0.071
Prop. of workers in city government 0.022 -0.003 0.022 -0.002 -0.003
Log(Population) -0.064 -0.015 -0.065 -0.024 -0.065
Observations (number of census tracts) 234 1429 232 1088 1088
TABLE A.3.B: CHANGES 1980-1990 TREATMENT AND CONTROLS
Untrimmed Trimmed
Note: Covariates marked JTW are based on the Journey-to-Work component of the Decennial Census. Covariates marked as LBD come 
from the Longitudinal Business Database and are analyzed over the period 1987-1992, all other tract level covariates come from the Census 
and analyzed over the period 1980-1990. City covariates are from the City Databook. Columns [1] and [2] report statistics for the complete 
(i.e. untrimmed) sample. Columns [3]-[5] report statistics for a sample that has been trimmed based on the estimated propensity score (see 
Section IV for details.) Columns [1] and [3] show statistics for census tracts inside EZs; columns [2] and [4] for control tracts in rejected or 
future treated areas (see Table A1 for details); column [5] shows statistics for control areas that have been parametrically reweighted (see 
Section III for details.)
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4Appendix I: Methods
A. Computation of PW Estimator
We run a pooled tract-level regression of the form
Ytzc = 
1Tz + (1   Tz)  X
0
n(t)




where Xn(t) is assumed to include a constant. Note that because this regression is fully interacted,




and b  = [b x; b p]
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Zm are weights obeying
P
m
(1   Tm)!m = 1.
It is straightforward to verify that for any covariate Qt 2 Zt,
P
t





Hence the regression weights yield reweighted covariate means among the controls numerically
equivalent to the corresponding covariate means in the treatment group. See Kline (2010b) for
the interpretation of this procedure as a propensity score reweighting estimator. We use these
weights in computing the reweighted control means reported in Figure 3 and column 5 of Table 3.
Tract level covariate means are not perfectly balanced in Table 3 because we condition on distance
weighted averages of covariates rather than tract level variables themselves.
The treatment eect estimator in (15) may be written b  = b 1   b 0, which is the quantity

























where b V 0 is the standard OLS cluster robust estimator of the covariance matrix of the estimated
parameters (b x; b p) and b V1 is the corresponding variance estimate of b 1. We use this analytical
variance estimate to construct an asymptotic pivot for use in our wild bootstrap procedure.
B. Wild Bootstrap Inference
As suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) we conduct inference using the cluster
robust percentile-t wild bootstrap with Rademacher weights. We impose the null hypothesis that
the coecient on the EZ dummy is zero when computing our residuals. This is done both for
computation of standard errors and p-values. See Kline and Santos (2010) for more on the theory
and performance of cluster-robust wild bootstrap tests in small samples.
55Appendix II: Data
A. Census
We use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 long-form Decennial Census of population. Variables
are drawn from the person, household, and geography les. Geographic variables on the 1980 and
2000 les use codes pertaining to the census geographic boundaries of their vintage. For both 1980
and 2000, we map place of residence geographic variables and place of work geographic variables to
1990 census tracts using crosswalk les from MABLE/Geocorr. Variables derived from Decennial
Census data include mean log wages and earnings by place of residence and by place of work, job
counts by place of residence and by place of work, housing characteristic variables, and demographic
variables used in the propensity score model and to construct regression adjusted outcomes.
Individual's wages are computed by dividing labor income in the previous year by the product
of weeks worked in the previous year and usual hours per week. We exclude wage observations
based on allocated earnings, hours, or weeks from our analysis and winsorize nonmissing wages
from below at 80% of the federal minimum wage in each year and from above at 40 times the
federal minimum wage in each year.
B. LBD and SSEL
We use business data from the 1987, 1992, and 2000 Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) les.
The LBD provides longitudinally linked establishment-level data for all establishments with paid
employees contained in the Census Bureau's Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL). Data
contained on these les comes primarily from the Economic Census and is supplemented with
tax records from the Internal Revenue Service. We coded each establishment to a 1990 census
tract using an algorithm described below based on the raw street addresses provided on the SSEL.
In addition to establishments' locations, we observe each establishment's age, size (number of
employees), payroll, industry, and whether the establishment belongs to a multi-establishment
rm.
The outcomes in the rst panel of Table 5 were computed as sums or averages over the universe
of rms in each tract/year. Logs were then taken at the tract level and outcomes were dierenced
over time. The outcomes in the remaining panels were constructed for the subset of rms present
in a given tract in 1992 obeying any stated restrictions on rm size. Sums or averages for this
population were then applied at the tract/year level and logs were again taken at the tract level
and then dierenced over time.
C. County/City Databook
We extract from the County/City Databook (CCD) 1980, 1990, and 2000 values of city level
variables such as crime rate, percentage of workers in the manufacturing sector and percentage of
workers working in the government.
D. HUD
We have information on 73 of the 78 applications sent to HUD. We have repeatedly requested the
5 missing applications to no avail. Our dataset also includes all census tracts that belong to any
56urban EZ, EC, Enhanced Enterprise Community (EEC), or Renewal Community (RC) of all the
rst three rounds. (See Table A1 for more details).
E. MABLE/Geocorr
The MABLE/Geocorr engine generates les showing the correspondence between a wide variety of
Census and cartographic geographies in the United States. We use Geocorr 1990 to map each 1980
census tract to one or more 1990 census tracts and Geocorr 2000 to map each 2000 census block
to one or more 1990 census tracts. The resulting crosswalk is used to assign a 1990 census tract
to each observation in: the 1980 Decennial Census (by place of residence and place of work), the
2000 Decennial Census (by place of residence and place of work), and the geocoded LBD data (by
establishment location).
In some cases the geographic mappings are not unique. For cases in which an observation's
geography maps to multiple 1990 census tracts, we create one duplicate of the observation being
mapped for each potential 1990 target census tract and then weight each source observation in
a manner that maintains representativeness. When mapping 1980 census tracts to 1990 census
tracts, weight is allocated across duplicated observations in proportion to the distribution of the
tract's 1980 population across 1990 tracts. When mapping 2000 census blocks to 1990 census tracts,
weight is allocated equally across duplicated observations.
We also use Geocorr 2000 to match each census tract to one or more places (cities, townships,
villages, etc.). Each census tract that crosses city boundaries was allocated to the city where the
majority of the tract's population is located.
F. Missingness/Weighting
We exclude observations with missing and allocated values when constructing several of the tract-
level variables included in the analysis. In most of these cases, we correct for the potential introduc-
tion of non-random selection by weighting nonmissing observations by the inverse of an estimate
of the probability of the observation's inclusion.
A rst set of missingness weights (applied to Decennial Census data) equals the inverse of the
probability of an individual having a valid (non-missing and non-allocated) place of work variable
conditional on observable traits and on the individual being employed. We estimate that conditional
probability with a linear probability model that includes main eects and all two-way interactions of
age (under 20, 20-39, 40-64, and 65+), sex, race (black, white, and other), and education (dropout,
high school grad, some college, and bachelors) and includes main eects for class of worker, wage
decile (where missing wages are treated as an eleventh decile), and tract of residence. The model
is estimated separately by county, year, and EZ assignment status according to tract of residence.
Predicted values were winsorized to lie in the interval [0:025;1]. These weights are applied when
computing tract aggregates of quantities dened by individuals' places of work. Those aggregates
include numbers of jobs and total earnings for tract workers residing in the zone, for tract workers
residing outside of the zone, and for tract residents working outside of the zone.
A second set of missingness weights (applied to Decennial Census data) equals the inverse of the
probability that an individual has a valid (non-missing and non-allocated) place of work variable
conditional on observable traits and on the individual being employed and having a non-allocated
57wage. We again estimate that conditional probability with a linear probability model that includes
main eects and all two-way interactions of age, sex, race, and education and includes main eects
for class of worker, wage decile, and tract of residence. The model is estimated separately by county,
year, and residence tract EZ assignment status. Predicted values are again winsorized to lie in the
interval [0:025;1]. These weights are applied when computing mean wages by individuals' places
of work. These variables include mean log wages of tract workers residing in the zone, mean log
wages of tract workers residing outside of the zone, and mean log wages of tract residents employed
outside of the zone.
A third set of weights (applied to LBD data) equals the inverse of the probability that an
establishment received a valid geocode during our geocoding algorithm conditional on observable
establishment traits. Because the set of potential covariates was much smaller in this case the prob-
abilities were estimated using parametric logit models. The explanatory variables in these models
were dummies for establishment age (full vector of indicators for each possible age), establishment
size (dened by total employment categories; 0-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, and 1000+), and 1-
digit industry categories. Separate missingness models were estimated for single establishment rms
and establishments belonging to multi-establishment rms within each county-year combination.
These weights were applied in construction of all LBD based variables.
For a small fraction of tract-years, we did not observe any tract workers who reside in the zone
containing the tract (local workers). To deal with this problem we replaced the change in the log of
the number of local workers with the gross change divided by the average number of local workers
in the two periods as suggested by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1993). This measure varies
between -2 and 2 and is well dened for tracts that have at least one local worker in either 1990 or
2000. For most tracts this measure yields values very close to the change in logs.
For tracts with no local workers we stochastically impute the mean log wage of such workers.
We rst regress the mean log wage of local workers on a large set of contemporaneous tract level
covariates35 in tracts for which the mean log wage of local workers is well dened. A separate
regression is run for each Decennial Census year by EZ treatment status. R2 statistics from the
imputation regressions are very high, often exceeding 0.9. We then impute a mean log wage for
local workers for tracts missing that variable by assigning the sum of the linear prediction from this
regression and a draw from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation equal to
the root mean squared error from the regression. Log wages are then re-winsorized to relative to
the minimum wage.
G. Covariates / Spatial Moving Averages
We include spatial moving averages of pre-treatment variables as controls in our regression adjusted
impact estimates. For each control variable, the spatial moving average assigned to a tract, j, is
35The covariates included in this regression are: mean log wage of tract residents, mean log wage of tract
workers residing outside of the zone, mean log wage of tract residents working outside of the zone, fraction
of tract residents with a commute less than 25 minutes, fraction of tract residents who are black, fraction
of tract residents who are Hispanic, fraction of tract residents who are high school dropouts, fraction of
tract residents with college attendance, fraction of tract residents greater than 65 years old, fraction of tract
residents less than 18 years old, fraction of tract residents who are employed, fraction of tract residents below
the poverty line, log of tract population, log of tract area, log of the number of households living in the tract,
an indicator for whether the tract was in the central business district in 1990, the distance to the central
business district, and a vector of state-city xed eects.
58the kernel weighted mean value of the control variable among a set of neighboring tracts N(j),
dened as those tracts (other than j itself) whose centroid falls within one mile of the centroid
of tract j. The weight given to each tract in the set N(j) is given by a truncated (at one mile)
normal kernel with a standard deviation of 0:5 miles applied to the distance between the centroid
of the neighboring tract and the centroid of tract j.
We used the following covariates in all specications labeled OLS or PW:
City Level: Change in log of city population 1980-1990, Change in city employment rate 1980-
1990, Proportion of city population black (1990), Total city crime / population* 100 (1990), Propor-
tion of city employment in manufacturing (1990), Proportion of city employment in city government
(1990).
Tract Level: Indicator for tract in central business district (1990), Poverty > 25% (1990),
Poverty > 35% (1990), Unemployment rate (1990), Ratio of number of 1990 households to 1980
population, Change in proportion of employed tract residents commuting < 25 minutes (1980-
1990), Change in proportion of tract workers with college degree (1980-1990), Proportion Hispanic
(1990), Proportion Hispanic (1980), Proportion black (1990), Proportion black (1980), Proportion
of structures vacant (1990), Proportion of structures vacant (1980), Building age index (1990), Pro-
portion < 18 years old (1990), Proportion < 18 years old (1980), Proportion of households female
headed (1990), Proportion of households female headed (1980), Proportion  65 years old (1990),
Proportion 65 years old (1980), Proportion of population who are high school dropouts (1990),
Proportion of population who are high school dropouts (1980), Change in mean log of housing
values (1980-1990), Change in mean log of rent (1980-1990), Change in log of tract population
(1980-1990), Change in log of households (1980-1990), Change in mean log wage of tract residents
(1980-1990), Change in mean log wage of tract workers (1980-1990), Change in log of tract employ-
ment - LBD (1987-1992), Change in log of average earnings per tract worker - LBD (1987-1992),
Change in log of number of tract establishments - LBD (1987-1992)
All tract level covariates save for central business district status were averaged across tracts
using the spatial kernel method.
H. Geocoding Algorithm
Our analysis of business data from the SSEL and LBD required that each establishment be coded
to a 1990 census tract. While a census tract variable appears on the SSEL les for 1992 and later,
the values are very often missing. Instead of using the existing tract variable, we implemented
an algorithm to assign establishments to census tracts based on their raw street addresses. Our
algorithm consisted of three steps. First we attempted to code each address in each cross-section of
the SSEL to a 2000 Census block36. For this step, we used the SAS/GIS batch geocoding module
36We tested our geocoding algorithm using both 1990 TIGER/Line data and 2000 TIGER/Line data.
An advantage of using the 1990 TIGER/Line les is that all coded establishments receive a 1990 Census
block code, a unit within which treatment status does not vary (EZs were awarded to collections of 1990
census tracts, which nest 1990 census blocks). We found however that the rate at which we successfully
assigned geocodes was higher by several percentage points using 2000 TIGER/Line les than when using
1990 TIGER/Line les. While the mapping from 2000 census blocks to 1990 census tracts is not one-to-one,
less than 0.5 percent of 2000 Census blocks overlap multiple 1990 census blocks in the counties containing
an EZ or control zone. We decided that the benet of the higher successful geocoding rate outweighed the
cost of slight mis-measurement of treatment assignment
59(invoked by the \%GCBATCH" macro). Second, using the longitudinal links provided by the
LBD, we lled in establishment-years with missing geocodes with the codes assigned to the same
establishment in neighboring years. Third, we assigned each establishment a 1990 census tract
based on its assigned 2000 Census block.
The SSEL provides at least one street address eld for each establishment in each annual
cross-section. For single establishment rms, a mailing address is nearly always provided, and a
physical address is sometimes provided. SSEL documentation suggests that the physical address
eld should be non-missing in each case in which a single establishment rm's physical address and
mailing address dier. For establishments belonging to multi-establishment rms, only a physical
address is provided.
As the rst step of our geocoding process, we applied the following algorithm to all SSEL
physical and mailing addresses of establishments located in counties containing an EZ or a control
zone. Note that for single establishment rms, we attempted to code two addresses when two
addresses were provided.
1. Import 2000 TIGER/Line data into SAS/GIS spatial data sets.
2. Geocode SSEL address data using the SAS/GIS batch geocoder.
3. Set aside all observations that received a geocode in step 2. Proceed using only observations
that have not yet received a geocode.
4. If all items on the following list have been reached, go to step 6. Otherwise, proceed and
perform the rst task on the following list that has not yet been performed.
(a) Remove all punctuation marks.
(b) Replace ordinal words with their numeric equivalents (e.g. third becomes 3rd).
(c) Remove gaps between two groups of numbers appearing at the beginning of address
strings (e.g. \123 45 Elm St" becomes \12345 Elm St").
(d) Remove ocial U.S. Postal Service secondary address identiers and all characters that
follow them (e.g. \123 Elm St Suite 1" becomes \123 Elm St").
(e) Abbreviate all ocial US Postal Service primary address identiers with their ocial
abbreviations (e.g. \123 Elm Street" becomes \123 Elm St").
(f) Remove spaces between adjacent letters commonly used to identify cardinal directions
(e.g. \123 S W Elm St" becomes \123 SW Elm St").
5. Return to step 2.
6. Stop.
In cases in which a physical address was successfully geocoded, we assigned the establishment the
geocode associated with that address. In cases in which we were unable to assigned a geocode to a
physical address (usually because none was provided), we assigned the establishment the geocode
associated with its mailing address.
In the second step of our geocoding process, we exploited the longitudinal links provided by
the LBD to impute missing geocodes for establishments that were successfully coded in some, but
60not all, of the years in which they appeared in the SSEL. If an establishment's rst observation to
receive a successful geocode occurred in year t, we assigned the year t geocode to any observations
for years prior to t. Similarly, if an establishment's last observation to receive a successful geocode
occurred in year t, we assigned the year t geocode to any observations for years later than t.
When an observation on the \interior" of an establishment's panel failed to receive a geocode, the
observation was assigned the geocode of the nearest successfully geocoded observation. When an
interior observation of this sort was equally close to two successfully geocoded observations, we
chose between the geocodes of those two observations randomly, giving each a 0.5 probability of
being selected.
In the nal step of our geocoding process, we assigned each successfully coded establishment-
year a 1990 Census tract based on the 2000 Census block assigned in the rst two steps. To do
this, we constructed a many to many crosswalk le relating 2000 Census blocks to 1990 Census
tracts. We began by downloading the Census provided Census Block Relationship File relating
1990 Census tabulation blocks to 2000 Census Tabulation blocks. The Census Block Relationship
File has one observation for each 1990 Census tabulation block and 2000 Census tabulation block
pair with a non-empty intersection. We created a 1990 Census tract variable from the provided
1990 Census block variable and dropped any duplicate observations of 1990 Census tract and 2000
Census block. We then merged this le by 2000 Census block to the list of geocoded addresses.
In cases in which a 2000 Census block mapped to N 1990 Census tracts, we duplicated the rm's
observation N times, assigned one observation to each potential 1990 Census tract, and assigned
weight 1=N to each of those observations in any subsequent analysis.
Appendix III: Regression Adjusted Outcomes
To remove the inuence of changes in demographic composition on tract level measures of behavior
and prices we computed composition constant outcomes by tract for each outcome of interest using
xed eects regressions. The regression specications used to adjust tract outcomes dier slightly
for individual level outcomes aggregated by residence tract, for individual outcomes aggregated by
place of work tract, and for housing characteristics.
In each case, a regression model was estimated on a pooled sample of micro-data that included
all observations with non-missing values of the dependent variable from 1980, 1990, and 2000.
Each regression specication included a full vector of tract-year dummy variables. For individ-
ual level outcomes aggregated by residence tract and for housing characteristics, the tract-year
dummy variables indicate an individual's residence tract or the tract in which a housing structure
was located. For individual level outcomes aggregated by place of work tract, tract-year dummy
variables indicate the tract in which an individual worked. For individual outcomes, the regression
specications included a quartic in age, dummy variables for black non-Hispanic and other race
(white non-Hispanic omitted), a dummy variable for female, and dummy variables for high school
dropout, any past college attendance, and actively enrolled in school (non-enrolled high school
graduate omitted). For housing stock outcomes, we included dummy variables for the number of
bedrooms, the number of rooms, three building age categories, two-way interaction terms between
bedrooms and rooms, and two-way interaction terms between bedrooms and building age. We
computed composition constant mean outcomes by evaluating the estimated regression equation
using a constant mix of included explanatory variables for each tract across the three years.
61Consider the adjustment of the mean of an outcome Yijzt which (switching notation) we now
take to denote the outcome of individual or housing unit i in tract j, zone z, and year t. A zone is
either an EZ, a control zone, or the non-EZ, non-control portion of a county containing an EZ or
control. We estimated the following regression equations separately by zone on a pooled sample of








Note that the mean OLS residual is zero for each tract-year because of the included tract-year
xed eects 0
jt. Hence we may decompose the change in the tract level mean Y j;t between 1990
and 2000 into a composition constant change and a composition eect as follows
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composition eect
where the Xj;t refer to tract by year averages of covariate values. The composition constant change
is the dierence between the two estimated tract-year xed eects while the composition eect is
the linear combination of the changes in mean tract characteristics.
We have also experimented with more complicated specications that allow the x
z coecients
to change over time by demographic group. These yield similar nal results but sometimes erratic
predictions for small demographic cells.
Appendix IV: Construction of Placebo Zones
To construct placebo zones we performed nearest neighbor matching without replacement on a
propensity score estimated on all tracts in the six cities receiving Round I EZs. The propensity
score was estimated on the pooled sample using a logit of assignment status on a large number of
covariates. Included in this list were a number of tract outcomes measured in 1990; these include a
vector of city indicators interacted with the fraction of households below the poverty line, a vector
of city indicators interacted with the fraction unemployed, a vector of city indicators interacted
with the population, a vector of city indicators interacted with the fraction of tract workers with a
commute time less than 25 minutes, the fraction living in the same house as ve years previous, the
fraction with college attendance, the fraction black, the fraction Hispanic, the employment rate, the
fraction who are high school dropouts, the fraction older than 65 years old, the fraction less than
18 years old, the fraction of structures that are vacant, the fraction that receive public assistance,
the fraction of households headed by a female, the fraction residing in an owner occupied dwelling,
the log of the number of households, the log of average wage of tract residents, the log of average
home values, the log of average monthly rent, average commute time of employed residents, the
distance to the central business district, the log of land area, and the fraction that work at home.
A similar list of outcomes measured in 1980 were also included; these included the fraction
living in the same house as ve years previous, the fraction with college attendance, the fraction
black, the fraction Hispanic, the employment rate, the fraction who are high school dropouts, the
fraction older than 65 years old, the fraction less than 18 years old, the fraction of structures that are
vacant, the fraction that receive public assistance, the fraction of households headed by a female, the
fraction residing in an owner occupied dwelling, the log of the number of households, and the share
62of dwellings that were owner occupied. Also included were interactions of the fraction households
in poverty 1990 with the fraction unemployed, the log of population, the fraction black, the fraction
Hispanic, the fraction who are high school dropouts, the fraction with college attendance. Dummy
indicators for poverty share below 25 percent, poverty share below 35 percent, population above
2000, fraction black equalling 100 percent, fraction with college attendance equal to 0 percent,
fraction Hispanic equal to 0 percent, fraction in owner occupied housing equal to 0 percent, location
in the central business district in 1990 were also included.
The results in Table 8 were generated by estimating a tract level propensity score on a pooled
sample of placebo tracts and controls using the same covariates as in earlier tables. We then
dropped tracts with estimate propensity scores in excess of 0:9 in order to ensure overlap in the
support of the two distributions. Finally we reestimated the propensity score model on the trimmed
sample and computed reweighted dierences-in-dierences impacts.
63Supplemental Appendix
A. Model Extension with Two Types of Workers
Let a xed proportion S of the agents be skilled and more productive than their unskilled counter-
parts who constitute the remaining U = 1   S of the population. Write the utility of individual
i of skill group g 2 fS;Ug living in community j 2 N and working in community k 2 f;;Ng and















jks is the wage a worker of skill group g from neighborhood j receives when working in
















ijks for worker i and denote the measure of agents of skill group g in each













Suppose that skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes in production so that rm
output may be written Bk (qSks + Uks)f (ks) where the Sks and Uks refer to total skilled and
unskilled labor inputs respectively, ks =
Kks
Bk(qSks+Uks) is the capital to eective labor ratio, and q
is the relative eciency of skilled labor. Now wages will obey
Bk

f (ks)   ksf0 (ks)

= wU




f0 (ks) = 
where wU
jks is the wage for unskilled workers and wS









so that productivity increases may still be detected by examining impacts on the wages of com-
muters. However, productivity eects may also shift the skill composition of local workers and
commuters which could lead us to over or understate these eects. For this reason we adjust our
wage impacts in the paper for observable skill characteristics.























































































mks. Furthermore we may write the deadweight









































d : This formula is eectively the same as that in (10), relying on the total covered wage
bill and the elasticity  . Were the elasticity to vary by type we would simply need to compute
the deadweight loss separately within skill group and average across groups using the marginal











































As before, the deadweight loss computation relies on the parameters a and b. Heterogeneity
provides no essential complication to the exercise since, with knowledge of these parameters, one
only needs to know the total wage bill and population inside of the zone to compute DWLG.
B. Monte Carlo Experiments
We simulated hierarchical datasets of 64 zones with a random number of tracts Nz within each zone.
The number of tracts per zone was generated according to Nz = 10 + e z where e zis a Negative
Binomial distributed random variable with the rst two moments matching the ones observed in
the data (i.e. a mean 21 and a standard deviation of 16 tracts). Hence, each simulated sample was
expected to yield approximately 1,344 census tracts with no zone containing less than 10 tracts in
any draw.
Outcomes were generated according to the model:
Ytz = zTz + x
t Xtz + p
zPz + z + etz
where Tz is an EZ assignment dummy, Xtz is a tract level regressor, Pz is a zone level regressor, z







5  N (0;I3)
To build in some correlation between the covariates and EZ designation, and to reect the fact that
treated zones tend to be larger, we model the EZ assignment mechanism as:
Tz = I (rank(T
z )  6) (17)
T
z = Xz + Pz + 0:008  Nz + uz
uz  N (0;1)




Xtz and the rank(:) function ranks the T
z in descending order. Note that this
assignment process imposes that exactly six zones will be treated. Hence, each simulation sample
will face the inference challenges present in our data.
The nature of the coecients (z;x
t ;
p
z) and the random eect z vary across our Monte Carlo
designs as described in the following table. We have two sets of results. In the rst set, which
we label symmetric, z follows a normal distribution. In a second set of results, which we label
asymmetric, z follows a 2 distribution:
Data Generating Processes
Symmetric Asymmetric
z  N (0;1) z  2 (4)
1. Baseline z = 0;x
t = 
p




2. Random Coecient on Xtz Same as 1) but, x
t  N (1;1) Same as 1) but, (x
t + 3)  2 (4)
3. Random Coecient on Pz Same as 1) but, 
p
z  N (1;1) Same as 1) but, (
p
z + 3)  2 (4)
4. Random Coecient on Tz Same as 1) but, z  N (0;1) Same as 1) but, (z + 4)  2 (4)
5. All deviations from baseline (2) + (3) + (4) (2) + (3) + (4)
Note that the null of zero average treatment eect among the treated is satised in each simu-
lation design. Specication 1) corresponds to the relatively benign case where our regression model
is properly specied and the errors are homoscedastic. Specication 2) allows for heteroscedasticity
with respect to the tract level regressor, while specication 3) allows some heteroscedasticity in
the zone level regressor. Specication 4) allows heteroscedasticity with respect to the treatment,
or alternatively, a heterogeneous but mean zero treatment eect. Specication 5) combines all of
these complications so that heteroscedasticity exists with respect to all of the regressors.
For each Monte Carlo design we compute three sets of tests of the true null that EZ designation
had no average eect on treated tracts. The rst (analytical) uses our analytical cluster-robust






  where and rejects when b t > 1:96. The second
(wild bootstrap-se) uses a clustered wild bootstrap procedure to construct a bootstrap standard






 > 1:96. The third approach (wild bootstrap-t) estimates the wild
bootstrap distribution F






  and rejects when b t > F 1
t (0:95) { where
F 1
t (0:95) denotes the 95th percentile of the bootstrap distribution of t statistics. Both the
bootstrap-se and bootstrap-t procedures simulate the bootstrap distribution imposing the null that
66 = 0 as recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). The false rejection rates for these
three tests in each of the ve simulation designs are given in the table below.
False Rejection Rates in Monte Carlo Simulations
Tract-level models
Analytical Analytical Wild Wild Wild Wild
s.e. s.e. BS-s.e. BS-s.e. BS-t BS-t
OLS PW OLS PW OLS PW
Symmetric
Baseline 0.126 0.074 0.039 0.111 0.054 0.053
Random Coecient on Xtz 0.125 0.075 0.036 0.113 0.056 0.051
Random Coecient on Pz 0.124 0.077 0.041 0.110 0.055 0.048
Random Coecient on Tz 0.123 0.073 0.041 0.110 0.055 0.053
All 0.124 0.080 0.042 0.110 0.059 0.051
Asymmetric
Baseline 0.123 0.106 0.037 0.138 0.055 0.056
Random Coecient on Xtz 0.121 0.109 0.041 0.136 0.047 0.049
Random Coecient on Pz 0.123 0.111 0.039 0.139 0.054 0.052
Random Coecient on Tz 0.132 0.111 0.039 0.142 0.053 0.056
All 0.125 0.111 0.038 0.128 0.051 0.051
Standard error based methods tend to overreject in both designs save for in the case of OLS
where the wild bootstrapped standard errors perform well. However the wild bootstrapped-t pro-
cedure yields extremely accurate inferences for both the OLS and PW estimators across all designs.
C. Industry Level Analysis
To further disentangle the role of the EZ wage subsidies from the block grants we examined whether
industries more intensive in zone labor expanded in response to EZ designation. This required
aggregation to the industry/zone level. We used the following 11 industry categories: Agriculture,
Forestry, Fisheries, and Mining; Construction; Non-durable goods manufacturing; Durable goods
manufacturing; Transportation, communications, and other utilities; Wholesale trade; Retail trade;
Finance, insurance, real estate; Business and repair services, personal services, entertainment, and
recreation services; Professional and related services; and Public administration.
Dene Riz as the fraction of workers in industry i of proposed zone z who live in the zone as
measured in the 1990 Census and Yiz as the change in total employment of industry i of zone z
between 1990 and 2000. We estimated regressions of the form:
Yiz = d0 + d1Riz + d2Tz + d3TzRiz + &iz
where &iz is a random error. The coecient of interest is d3 which measures the dierential eect
of EZ designation on employment growth in industries intensive in local labor. We try augmenting
this regression with zone eects, which are perfectly collinear with Tz which we drop in those
specications. The zone eects absorb any idiosyncratic zone wide shocks.
These regressions likely suer from attenuation bias since Riz is estimated from microdata. To
deal with this we tried instrumenting for Riz and TzRiz using Ri: and TzRi: (where Ri: is the total
number of jobs in industry i staed by zone residents across all sample zones divided by the total
67number of jobs in industry i for all sample zones) and the 1980 values of Riz and TzRiz. Clustered
wild bootstrap-t critical values are obtained for the IV estimates via a modication of the methods
in Davidson and Mackinnon (2010). The results are given in the Table below:
Industry Shift-Share Models
Dependent variable: Change in the log employment at the industry-zone level









IV Zone Eects 1:155
[0:875]
Note: Wild bootstrap s.e. in square
brackets. Stars reect signicance level
obtained via a clustered wild bootstrap-
t procedure. Legend: * signicant at
10% level; ** signicant at 5% level; ***
signicant at 1% level.
As expected instrumenting raises our estimate of coecient of interest relative to OLS. The
results are centered around d3  1 which suggests a one percentage point increase in local employ-
ment share raises the impact of EZ designation on industry employment by one percent. These
results reinforce our conclusion that the EZ wage credits (rather than city-wide shocks) stimulated
local labor demand.
D. Untrimmed Results
Table Supplemental Appendix D shows impact estimates in the untrimmed sample for the Na ve,
OLS and PW estimators. We nd a similar pattern of results to that found in the trimmed sample.
68Model Naïve OLS PW
[1] [2] [3]
Log (Jobs) -LBD 0.097 0.150 0.166
[0.065]* [0.062]** [0.052]**
Log (Jobs) -JTW 0.187 0.201 0.185
[0.102]   [0.077]** [0.074]**
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.166 0.163 0.161
[0.113]   [0.080]*  [0.075]  
Log (Zone Jobs Held by Non-Residents) 0.161 0.158 0.143
[0.084]   [0.064]** [0.057]**
Log (Non-Zone Jobs Held by Zone Residents) 0.033 0.076 0.072
[0.068]   [0.070]   [0.060]  
Log (Average Earnings per Worker) 0.026 0.040 0.026
[0.025]   [0.031]   [0.015]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Workers) -0.006 0.015 0.012
[0.020]   [0.022]    [0.015]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) -unadjusted 0.029 0.050 0.044
[0.035]   [0.023]*   [0.019]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) -adjusted 0.025 0.051 0.046
[0.031]   [0.025]*   [0.019]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents) -comp. 0.004 -0.001 -0.002
[0.006]   [0.005]    [0.004]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working in Zone) 0.079 0.140 0.124
[0.050]* [0.064]*** [0.050]**
Log (Hourly Wage of Non-Residents Working in Zone) -0.010 -0.003 -0.003
[0.020]   [0.023]    [0.015]  
Log (Hourly Wage of Zone Residents Working Outside Zone) 0.027 0.060 0.063
[0.028]   [0.029]**  [0.018]* 
Log (Establishments) 0.015 0.040 0.038
[0.028]   [0.023]*  [0.021]  
Log (Rent) -unadjusted 0.023 0.026 0.028
[0.034]    [0.027]    [0.023]   
Log (Rent) -adjusted 0.015 0.016 0.020
[0.029]    [0.023]    [0.021]   
Log (Rent) -comp. 0.008 0.010 0.008
[0.012]    [0.010]    [0.007]   
Log (House Value) -unadjusted 0.370 0.354 0.354
[0.223]*   [0.164]**  [0.155]   
Log (House Value) -adjusted 0.364 0.349 0.348
[0.218]*   [0.157]**  [0.148]*  
Log (House Value) -comp. 0.006 0.005 0.006
[0.008]    [0.007]    [0.004]   
Log (Households) -0.007 -0.013 0.000
[0.073] [0.037] [0.033]
Log (Population) -0.014 0.031 0.043
[0.055] [0.030] [0.029]
% Same House as Five Yrs Ago -0.004 0.004 0.006
[0.009] [0.009] [0.005]
% Vacant Houses 0.016 -0.008 -0.006
[0.013]    [0.009]    [0.007]   
Note: Outcomes marked JTW are based on the Journey-to-Work component of the Decennial Census. Outcomes 
marked as LBD come from the Longitudinal Business Database and are analyzed over the period 1992-2000, all other 
outcomes come from the Census and are analyzed over the period 1990-2000.  All figures computed on the 
untrimmed estimation sample (see Section IV.) Columns [1]-[3] give differences-in-differences (DD) estimates on a 
sample of untreated placebo tracts chosen by nearest neighbor matching. Columns [4]-[6] give DD impacts on 
percentile ranks of outcomes (see Section VI) in trimmed sample. Columns labeled "Naive" report a DD estimate 
without controls. Columns labeled "OLS" report the OLS DD estimate controlling for lagged city and tract level 
characteristics. Columns labeled "PW" report parametric reweighting DD estimates. See Appendix II.G for list of 
covariates. Standard errors are shown in square brackets and are clustered by city (69 clusters).  Stars reflect 
significance level obtained by a clustered wild bootstrap-t procedure described in the appendix. Legend: * significant 
at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. See the Appendix and Section III for details.
D. Baseline Results Untrimmed
69